

ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

NEWSLETTER



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Editorial

The relationship between Europe and the United States is under greater strain than it has been for nearly 50 years. Although France and Germany clearly do not speak for the whole of Europe these distinctions are often overlooked in much that is spoken and written on this issue. Anti-Europeanism is on the rise in America. Anti-Americanism is rampant in much of Europe.

Yet it remains true that the partnership between Europe and North America is one of the great forces for good in the world. Whatever our differences we continue to share the fundamental values of democracy, free enterprise and the rule of law. If we work together, on the basis of these values, all the world's problems become easier to solve. But if these problems instead become the cockpits of transatlantic rivalry the world will become a much less safe place.

The role of Atlantic Partnership is to remind decision makers on both sides of the Atlantic of the validity of these propositions. Of course there will be differences of opinions from time to time. But even on issues as crucial as Iraq every effort should be made to massage those differences so that as little change as possible is done to the wider relationship. We should do all we can to prevent friction becoming fracture.

To this end our panellists have been very active in print and the electronic media. I have hosted a dinner in Paris and a breakfast in Berlin to discuss with our panellists and others ways in which we can achieve our objective. Meetings have also taken place in New York and we have opened our office in Washington.

Never has the promotion of Atlantic Partnership been more necessary and important. I hope you will continue to help us.

MICHAEL HOWARD

The Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP is Chairman of Atlantic Partnership

Atlantic Partnership this Winter

It has been an extremely busy winter for Atlantic Partnership.

We launched Atlantic Partnership in Berlin this January with a breakfast given in the presence of our German patron, Karsten Voigt, the US-German Coordinator in the present German government. We were delighted to have Hans-Ulrich Klose (Foreign Policy Committee of the German Bundestag) speak about the importance of the transatlantic relationship, emphasising Germany's role. Against the background of strained relations between Germany and America over the imminent war against Iraq the subject was particularly topical and led to a lively discussion.

Guests included:

- **HE The Canadian Ambassador, Marie Bernard Meunier**
- **HE Jürgen Chrobog, Secretary of State, Auswärtiges Amt**
- **Prof. Dr. Barbara Ischinger, Vicepresident, Humboldt University**
- **Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Director of the Research Institute German Council on Foreign Relation**
- **Ambassador (R) John C Kornblum, Chairman Lazard and Company**
- **HE the British Ambassador, Sir Paul Lever**
- **Markus Meckel (SPD), Member of the German Bundestag**
- **Ruprecht Polenz (CDU/CSU), Member of the German Bundestag**
- **Robert von Rimscha, Der Tagesspiegel**
- **Reinhold Robbe (SPD), Member of the German Bundestag**
- **Prof. Dr. Gesine Schwan President Viadrina University**
- **Prof Dr Christoph Stölzl, Chairman of the CDU Berlin Deputy President of the Berlin House of Deputies**

Our German panellists have been busy writing articles about Germany and their position on Iraq. We have included two by Josef Joffe and our patron Karsten Voigt in the opinion section below.

As relations between France and America worsened, we met with our French panellists in Paris and encouraged them to promote in public a more constructive approach to relations with America. We include below an article by author, Laurent Cohen Tanugi. We have arranged for Felix Rohatyn to address an Atlantic Partnership breakfast in Paris in May and Richard Perle is due to address the Franco-American group of MPs in the Assemble Nationale.

We have been busy promoting our work in the USA. We have opened an office in Washington. Events in New York has included an introductory reception in January, a lunch given by Henry Kissinger for Atlantic Partnership and a debate on Iraq.

People in Atlantic Partnership




New Patrons

We are delighted to have three new Atlantic Partnership Patrons. Former Prime Minister Alain Juppe from France (pictured above left), Fredrich Merz from Germany, who is the head of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag and Senator Joe Biden from the United States of America (below). Senator Biden has been Chairman of the prestigious Senate Foreign Affairs Committee he is now the lead Democrat on the Committee having stepped down for his Republican colleague, Senator Luger after the mid-term election results.

Message from Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

'I am proud to be a Patron of the Atlantic Partnership and enthusiastically endorse its commitment to revitalizing the links between Europe and North America. Since 1945 the cooperative efforts of democracies on both sides of the Atlantic have been the most productive in history. Together, our governments and people maintained the peace, generated remarkable prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic, and ended the tragic division of Europe. I believe that we - who share a dedication to freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law - should now apply our successful formula of consultation and cooperation to addressing grave threats to our common security in other parts of the world.'



Atlantic Partnership Opinion

We launched our Atlantic Partnership panel in October of last year. Since then our panellists have been speaking and writing about the importance of preserving and prioritising the transatlantic relationship at this time of stress.

We have included some of these articles for your attention below.

- **Remarks by Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Atlantic Partnership US Vice Chairman during a hearing featuring testimony from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.**
- **Sir Malcolm Rifkind, panellist, writes in *The Times* that old fashioned diplomacy will heal the rift in the Western alliance.**
- **Congressman and panellist, Doug Bereuter, panellist and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe, writes that the NATO treaty means the defence of Turkey is a clear obligation.**
- **Karsten Voigt, Atlantic Partnership patron and the US German coordinator in the present German government, writes about the relationship between the two countries in the aftermath of a German election campaign where anti Americanism was widespread.**
- **Charles Powell, Atlantic Partnership Vice Chairman UK, writes about France, Germany and Iraq.**
- **Michael Howard, Atlantic Partnership Chairman looks at the state of the transatlantic relationship in the middle of the Iraq crisis for the *New York Post***
- **Dr Henry Kissinger, Atlantic Partnership patron, writes for *Le Figaro* on the USA, NATO and Europe, as opposition to a war against Iraq mounts in France.**
- **Josef Joffe, panellist and editor of the German week *Die Zeit* looks at the present crisis over Iraq and wonders how Germany has ended up where it is.**
- **Former UN Ambassador and panellist Sir John Weston puts the case for multinationalism.**
- **Lord Howell, panellist, writes on why America should not 'go it alone' in Iraq.**
- **Dr Christoph Bertram, panellist, looks at the European American relationship, from a German perspective.**
- **On the launch of his new book *Laurent Cohen-Tanugi*, writer and panellist, writes about the French stance on Iraq.**

- **Douglas Bereuter and Pierre Lellouche call for joint action in a article in *Le Figaro***
- **We have also included articles from *Time Magazine* which mentions Atlantic Partnership, and *The Economist*. Both analyse the latest surveys on the transatlantic relationship and assess the case for the rise of anti-Americanism in Europe.**

“Pathology of Success”

Opening Remarks by Chairman Henry J Hyde at a February 26, 2003 hearing by the House International Relations Committee for Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Mr. Secretary, Welcome to the Committee on International Relations. On behalf of my colleagues, thank you for your dedicated service to our country.

We are eager to hear your testimony, but before that, I would like to offer a few thoughts. I would then ask the distinguished Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Lantos, to offer remarks of his own.

We meet at a time of great peril and great opportunity. The peril is obvious: aggressive regimes - armed with weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled by any domestic political constraints, and linked to international terrorist networks in a shadow world of malice where the murder of innocents is considered a noble vocation. These threaten the very possibility of order in world affairs. In Iraq, the world's fifty-eight-year experiment with collective security is being put to the supreme test. If Iraq is permitted to defy twelve years of United Nations resolutions demanding its disarmament, then that fifty-eight-year experiment in collective security will be, for all intents and purposes, over. In enforcing the will of the UN as expressed most recently in Resolution 1441, the United States and its allies are upholding the minimum conditions for world order. Let us hope that Iraqi disarmament can be enforced with the united support of the Security Council. But let us make certain that effective and decisive enforcement takes place - by what the President has called a "coalition of the willing," if necessary.

This peril also contains, in my view, a great opportunity. The opportunity is to recast the politics of a turbulent region of the world, so that opportunities for real stability are created. What we often call "stability" in the Middle East has been, for the past half-century, the most volatile instability. The world cannot live with this instability much longer. It threatens world peace. It threatens the global economy. And, as the bitter lesson of 9-11 taught us, the instability of the Middle East can now reach around the globe and directly threaten the security of the people of the United States.

America is often said to be a "hyperpower," yet our actions are repeatedly frustrated by an endless train of objections and obstacles. America has fought distant wars to defend whole continents from a succession of aggressors, but the beneficiaries of the safety we have ensured often devote their energies to impeding our efforts to help others. We shoulder burdensome responsibilities for the benefit of the entire globe, but too often we must do so alone.

Americans are rightly puzzled by this and by what appears to many to be ingratitude, and even hostility, on the part of friends and allies. We see our own motives as noble and believe this fact to be self-evident. We are not an imperial power coldly focused

on the subjugation of others or on securing some narrow advantage for ourselves. Instead, we are frequently moved to action by the plight of others, often losing sight of our own self-interest in our zeal to make the world right. None can doubt that, for over half a century, we have employed our power in the service of making the world safe, peaceful, and prosperous to the extent of our ability to do so.

It is true that we are not motivated by altruism alone. We cannot be, for we have a responsibility for our own welfare that cannot be delegated to others, not even the UN. But altruism has always been woven into the policies of our republic. Given the nature of our fundamental principals and beliefs, it cannot be otherwise.

How is it then that we do so much for so many others and yet have to plead for support? Why is it always so difficult to enlist others in causes from which all benefit? Why do we carry global responsibilities, yet others feel no need to assume a share of the collective burden?

While it may be tempting to resent our allies and others for what appears as cynical and perverse behavior, the truth is that this puzzle is one of our own making. It is in fact the product of our very success in remaking the world. It is the defining trait of what may be termed

"The Pathology of Success." Great success often prompts a corresponding envy in others, and our occasional humbling is a rich and guilty pleasure often indulged in by friends and foes alike. That is the principal reason Castro is celebrated by a spectrum of leaders stretching from Third World dictators to our NATO allies. The former take heart from the fact that he has defied the power of the United States and survived. For the latter, cultivating ties with our declared enemy has long been an easy and risk-free way for them to demonstrate their independence from us, even as we remain pledged to their defense.

Dependence can also evoke a corrosive resentment that can slumber in the deepest layers, even with friends. This is especially true among those whose ambitions are not matched by their capabilities and who are reminded of their less-than-central role in the world by what they believe is our failure to sufficiently consult with them regarding our own decisions.

Ultimately, however, these explanations do not adequately describe the phenomenon. The fundamental problem is simply this: Given our strength, the urgency of our many concerns, and our willingness to proceed alone, if necessary, we have liberated others from the responsibility of defending their own interests, to say nothing of any responsibility for the collective interests of the West. Many would watch the night descend on others in far-away countries of which they know little without any feeling that perhaps they should do something to halt it and that not doing so might be a perilous option. Far from assisting, they might even devote their energies to preventing others from doing something.

The vast extent of our success has created the equivalent of a moral hazard, the dangers of which we are encountering with increasing frequency. The clearest example of this in the international system is Europe. In the 1,500 years following the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe was a warring continent, where suspicion and

betrayal were forces of nature, and peace but an uncertain interlude between conflicts. This world was upended by the United States. In the aftermath of World War II, with Europe devastated and still smoldering from ancient hatreds, the United States assumed a dominant role in all aspects, reviving prostrate economies with unprecedented aid, shoring up weak democracies, insisting on ever-closer cooperation between former enemies, establishing the institutions by which a unity of purpose came into being, weaving the whole into a community.

And embracing it all, the United States provided an absolute guarantee of safety. Problems shrank to the scale of daily life; dangers evaporated into abstract metaphors. Sheltered by American power, the hostilities of the untamed world beyond became remote, and then imaginary.

This unearned inheritance did not require any of the beneficiaries to assume any risk, take on oppressive burdens, acknowledge their debt, or do anything other than focus on a pursuit of self-interest. They remained safe regardless of what they did or did not do. The natural state of the world was transformed from one ruled by fear and competition to one of safety and peace. And, like Nature, it required no effort on the part of man to bring it into being. Instead of hard choices of war and peace, it was more akin to selecting from an a la carte menu, guided only by one's tastes and momentary preferences. It was a profoundly false view of the world, but can we fault those who were raised in this cocoon of our making?

We may blame others for their short-sightedness, but it is we who have distorted their perceptions of reality. It is we who have created a beneficent, but artificial, environment so secure that its beneficiaries believe it to be self-sustaining. They feel neither need nor obligation to do anything to defend their interests, to secure those of the West, to ensure order rather than disorder in the world beyond their garden.

Seen from this perspective, the United States becomes not the protector of the West in Iraq and elsewhere, but its tormentor, its power not the source of security but of disorder, a blundering and myopic Goliath whose misguided efforts are threatening to all. If only the U.S. were to desist, they say, we would once again be serene. The image is so inverted that one can almost hear the distant musical strains of the "The World Turned Upside Down."

To a lesser degree, a similar situation prevails in East Asia, where the conquest, oppression, fear, and war of the past have given way to a prosperous, cooperative, secure system of free states, one which I am pleased to say is populated by an increasing number of democracies. The United States played a direct hand in bringing about many of these historic changes, but its most profound contribution was to create and defend a nurturing and secure environment in which this transformation could take place. And we have defended it with tens of thousands of American dead and uncounted billions in treasure.

But here again, we see the dangerous abdication of responsibility that has arisen out of the artificial environment we have established. All problems have become America's responsibility, while others, even those with more immediate interests than ours, stand on the sidelines offering passive encouragement or vocal abuse.

We see the absurdity of this situation in the current crisis regarding North Korea. Somehow, this problem is judged by both ourselves and others to be ours, and almost ours alone.

It is not seen as a challenge to be met by the countries of East Asia, which watch to see the course we will take in order to tack to the prevailing winds. It is not assumed to be that of the rest of the world, which distractedly wonders why the U.S. has not yet resolved this far-away problem. Nor is it that of China, whose influence in Pyongyang is paramount and without whose assistance the regime would quickly collapse.

It is not even that of South Korea, which we liberated at great cost in young lives and have defended from conquest for over half a century, but where we are now openly accused of being the unwelcome source of that peninsula's misfortunes.

The familiarity of these problems, however, obscures a deeper danger. We have entered a new and more threatening century, one in which the civilized world will be under increasing assault from the forces of terror and dismemberment. These forces cannot be dissuaded by reason or by the paying of tribute. We are certain to discover that our ability to hold back the rising tide of disorder is finite and that we cannot by ourselves alone defend the West from those who even now are plotting our destruction. Others must now take up their long-ignored responsibility and assume their place in the line, not only for their own sake but for us all.

We cannot wait for disaster to awaken them from their dreams of summer. Instead, we must expose them to the dangers of a rough reality, for only with the ensuing abrasions is there hope that their comforting illusions can be worn away. The alarm has already begun to sound, but, as yet, it remains unheard.

Justice demands that I make an exception to my reproach, and that exception is Britain. Our ties are deep. Britain remains the mother country even for those Americans whose ancestors never touched British soil. We are joined not merely by common interests, but by a shared recognition that, if our world is to be preserved, we have no option but to accept our duty. For Britain, the term "ally" is simply insufficient. We are, in truth, partners. In saying this, I do not mean to fail to express my admiration of the dozens of countries who have bravely offered their support.

We have made much of the world a welcoming one for all the wondrous things to which mankind has aspired over the centuries. But we have also established it on a perilous foundation, one that permits its citizens a fatal irresponsibility.

The fault is ours, not theirs. It is we who have mistakenly allowed others to learn a false and dangerous lesson. To believe that the peace and safety of the West, the product of centuries of effort, will maintain itself, that order need not be wrested from the storms and chaos that surround us, to believe that our world is not a fragile thing, is to risk everything. We have in fact made our world safe in the disastrous belief that others need not share a part of the collective burden, that there is no burden to be borne at all.

We may, in fact, be risking everything. Let me quote the warning by the philosopher, Ortega y Gasset: If you want to make use of the advantages of civilization, but are not prepared to concern yourself with the upholding of civilization - you are done...Just a slip, and when you look around, everything has vanished into air.

It is one of the paradoxes of our time that the American people, who have never dreamed dreams of empire, should find themselves given a unique responsibility for the course of world history. As you said so eloquently during your recent speech at Davos, Mr. Secretary, Americans did not go into the world in the 20th Century for self-aggrandizement, but rather for the liberation of others - asking of those others only a small piece of ground in which to bury our dead, who gave their lives for the freedom of men and women they never knew or met. Now, in these first, determinative years of the 21st Century, we are being challenged to such large tasks again. We did not ask to be so challenged, but we dare not let the challenge go unanswered.

That is why we are grateful for your time this morning, Secretary Powell: because there are many things to discuss, as we consider how our actions in the next weeks and months can create the conditions for a new Middle East, and for a new and more humane method of managing world affairs so that freedom's cause may flourish.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind writes in *The Times*, 18th February 2003

‘Old fashioned diplomacy will heal the rift in the Western alliance.’

That Tony Blair is enmeshed in a crisis that might destroy his Government I can face with equanimity. That the British Prime Minister has put himself and his country between an irresistible force and an immovable object deeply disturbs me.

He has wanted Britain to be a bridge between America and Europe. As has been remarked London bridge is now falling down. It might take Nato with it despite the weekend's breakthrough on Turkey. That would leave President Saddam Hussein more cheerful than ever.

And yet there is an opportunity for Mr Blair to use traditional diplomacy to break this logjam and achieve a substantial degree of unity on the Security Council. If one puts on one side the conciliatory charm of Donald Rumsfeld and the Gallic acerbity of Dominique de Villepin one can identify common ground among the rubble.

The French have been careful not to rule out a military attack on Iraq if UN inspections fail to disarm Saddam. They acknowledge that President Bush's uncompromising toughness has forced Saddam into more concessions than he has made for years. No one in Paris denies that the US threat of force was essential to this.

Likewise Washington means it when it emphasises that it would like to avoid war and that it is well aware of the damage that a unilateral attack without UN endorsement would do to its reputation in the Arab world and relations with its European allies. Only last week the Americans were stressing that they would accept Saddam's voluntary exile as a way of resolving the crisis without bloodshed.

So there is no fundamental disagreement about the objective of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and of its capability to create them. However, the French and their allies believe that this can be achieved by the current UN inspection process. Mr Bush and Mr Blair are intensely sceptical.

This is where Hans Blix becomes the key to progress. In his report to the Security Council he stated his conviction that the inspection process could disarm Saddam in the near future, but only if it received “immediate, active and unconditional co-operation” which was not yet the case.

British diplomats must seize on that statement and co-ordinate negotiations between the permanent members of the Security Council and Mr Blix on the terms of a new resolution. This resolution must be much more specific than the last. It must demand compliance, to Mr Blix’s satisfaction, within two or three weeks at most, with the likelihood of force if Saddam refuses.

For example, Mr Blix’s main concern is that the Iraqis have failed to account for the chemical and biological agents identified by the inspectors four years ago. As the inspectors have pointed out it is not their duty to find them. Iraq must prove that they have already been destroyed or hand them over for destruction.

Likewise, as the inspectors have demanded, there must be an acceptance, by Iraq, that their long-range missiles fall into the proscribed list and must be surrendered. Remaining Iraqi scientists who have not yet been interviewed must present themselves unconditionally. These and other specific obligations must be put into any new resolution.

Mr Blix has said that Baghdad has made concessions on process but has still to meet its obligations on substance. If France and Germany can acknowledge that those obligations must be met over the next three weeks, this would meet America’s concern that a further resolution must not merely provide an opportunity to procrastinate. The Americans are right to say that what is needed is not more inspectors but full compliance. Mr Blix agrees with them.

A tough, time-limited resolution will not be achieved without Britain. No one should doubt the deep damage that has already been done to transatlantic relations by a combination of American cavalier indifference to its allies’ concerns and France and Germany’s extraordinary foolishness in splitting Nato on the largely symbolic question of Patriot missiles for Turkey.

The Nato disagreement was resolved at the weekend but we should not get too euphoric about that. Although Germany and Belgium recanted they did so for tactical reasons, not because their basic position has changed. France was not even involved as the decision was taken in the defence policy committee, not the full Nato Council. France has not been represented there since de Gaulle’s time as she has never accepted Nato as an integrated military alliance. The harsh truth is Nato remains as divided as the Security Council.

Left to themselves the gulf between the Western allies will get wider and Saddam will be the only beneficiary. British diplomats under our Ambassador at the UN, Sir

Jeremy Greenstock, have the skill to deliver a compromise that will determine whether Saddam can be disarmed in the near future or whether, as the French have never ruled out, force may be necessary.

The stakes could not be higher. When Mr Bush threatened military intervention some months ago the downside appeared to be greater instability in the Middle East and a possible boost to Islamic terrorist organisations. Now, thanks to Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder, Washington has become more disillusioned than ever with Nato and the aspiration of a single European foreign policy has become risible.

Britain's bridge across the Atlantic looks shaky at the moment. To secure its foundations will need more than Mr Blair's rhetoric. It will need professional diplomatic skill.

It was once remarked that diplomats were people who could be disarming especially when their country wasn't. That should be their role and the Prime Minister must give them his full support. It is more than his survival which is at stake.

*The author was Foreign Secretary from 1995 to 1997.
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13 February, 2003 in the Omaha World-Herald

**NATO treaty means the defense of Turkey is a clear obligation
BY DOUG BEREUTER**

[The writer, a Republican who represents Nebraska's 1st District in the U.S. House of Representatives, is chairman of the House Subcommittee on Europe and is president of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.]

If France, Germany and Belgium fail to approve the prudent planning steps requested for the defense of Turkey under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it would have profound, deleterious effects on the alliance. At best, it would inexcusably delay planning for the defense of an ally, possibly leading to an avoidable loss of life should Turkey come under attack. At worst, it means the very end of the alliance, as its core mutual-defense guarantee would be exposed as nothing more than empty words from the French, German and Belgian governments.

No longer is this a question of whether authorizing NATO planning somehow signals a decision to use military force against Iraq. This was the argument used by the three allies on Monday when they blocked that step. Now, with Turkey having subsequently invoked Article 4, the very credibility of the alliance is at stake.

Should France, Germany and Belgium continue to object to prudent contingency planning to deter or defend against a possible threat to Turkey, the core collective-defense commitment of the alliance will be called into doubt.

At the same time, France, Germany and Belgium need to remember that the objective of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 is not to perfect the U.N.

inspection process and thereby complete a truly impossible task of finding all of the stocks and production programs for weapons of mass destruction and prohibited ballistic missiles. The objective is to deprive Saddam Hussein of those weapons; it is not to play the impossible high-stakes game of hide-and-seek in a country that is larger than Germany plus the Benelux countries.

There is an overwhelming international consensus that Iraq must be disarmed. Among European and North American legislators, this consensus was demonstrated in November 2002, when the 214-member NATO Parliamentary Assembly called upon alliance governments "to declare that failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of all U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations, and that Iraq will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations."

I therefore strongly disagree with the idea that the proper response to Iraqi intransigence is simply to strengthen inspections. However, now that Article 4 has been invoked, France, Germany and Belgium can approve the prudent steps that have been requested to defend Turkey without prejudging the question of whether military force against Iraq should be authorized.

I hope that French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt recognize that this is no longer an Iraq question. This is no longer a U.N. question. This is now a question about whether the 19 NATO allies will fulfill their solemn treaty commitments and take steps to reassure an ally that believes its security to be threatened.

The formal invocation of the treaty means that this question is now about whether NATO will do the one main thing that NATO was founded to do: defend an ally against an outside attack.

Clearly, Turkey is concerned that events in Iraq may lead to an armed attack against it. After a presentation Monday by the head of NATO's Military Committee, NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson said that "these concerns are legitimate, and the threat is real." Were such an attack to occur, it would trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the collective-defense clause that lies at the heart of NATO.

The United States and, I believe, most of the 15 other allies who support our position will certainly go ahead with planning for the defense of Turkey outside of NATO structures, if that unfortunately proves necessary. Our 16 nations recognize that our solemn treaty commitment must be honored. We recognize that we must plan to defend Turkey so that we are not caught off guard should our ally be attacked.

I hope that France, Germany and Belgium will allow this planning to go forward within the structures that NATO has established for this very contingency. If NATO cannot take prudent steps to plan for the defense of one of its members (the fundamental basis for the existence of NATO), we will have to give serious thought to whether NATO remains relevant if it cannot discharge its primary responsibility.

At the same time, the overheated rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic must cool

down, as it is deeply divisive and will have tragic consequences for the transatlantic relationship. The transatlantic link is far too important to destroy with emotional words and imprudent insults.

All 19 democracies in NATO face serious threats to their homelands and their populations, most notably from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the possibility that the two might be combined. As we have for 54 years, we must confront these threats together. As allies, we must begin planning for the defense of Turkey.

"The state of current US-German relations"

Karsten D Voigt

Since the parallel election campaigns in Germany and the US, bilateral relations between the two countries seem to have got on to rocky ground. In both campaigns, the issue of Iraq played an important role, but in different ways. As a result, some harsh words and accusations were traded across the Atlantic. Not only were these trade-offs most unfortunate, but they also totally misrepresented the reality of the German-American friendship.

For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been one of the basic tenets of German foreign policy alongside the process of European unification in the EU. For all of us, this special relationship was, is and will continue to be based on values, interests, and ultimately visions of what the world should look like. Germany's reaction to 11 September illustrates our closeness to the US. It was the German people who after 11 September demonstrated second to none their horror, grief and sympathy with the American people. In the political arena, Chancellor Schröder pledged unstinting solidarity with the US in the global fight against terrorism. With his decision to commit troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and the military campaign in Afghanistan last year, he even placed his political existence on the line – and it worked. Just last week, the German Bundestag renewed Germany's commitment to Enduring Freedom.

A recent study by the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations confirms once more that when it comes to values and principles, the Germans, British and Americans do not have such different ideas as media reports would have us believe.

Bearing in mind this solid bedrock, the obvious question is how did the debate on Iraq evolve into the current discord.

Firstly, we should not forget that Germany, the UK and the US agree on the fundamental aspects, even in the debate on Iraq. We agree that Saddam Hussein is a brutal and aggressive dictator who has flouted UN Security Council resolutions with possibly the worst of intentions. We agree that the weapons inspectors should fulfil their task and that Iraq should be relieved of its weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. However, Germany and the US have disagreed in the past about the right methods to achieve these common goals. Germany welcomed the US decision to go to the UN in search of a multilateral solution. We applaud the new UN Security

Council resolution. It has opened a way forward for a political solution. We are also aware that if Saddam fails to live up to his obligations and a political solution subsequently fails, the US is working on post-Saddam concepts for the region which would address a number of concerns Germany has raised and about which it feels strongly. Even though Germany remains sceptical about military action, we recognise that it is Saddam who is posing a threat, it is up to him to adhere to the UN resolutions and bring peace to his country.

Secondly, the discord on Iraq is mainly between our current governments. Neither the American nor the European nations are enthusiastic about a war against Iraq. On the contrary, they ask the same questions and voice similar concerns.

Thirdly, Germans remain torn about war in general, and about Iraq in particular. Given their traumatic memories of World War II, Germans are very adverse to the thought of German troops going to war. In the past forty years, the Federal Republic of Germany has had great success with its multilateral foreign policy and it will continue to strive to solve problems primarily along these lines. The situation is even more complicated for the citizens in East Germany. As a result of their own post-war history, they tend towards pacifism, wish to avoid any additional uncertainties after the overwhelming changes of 1990 and harbour suspicions about global power politics.

The aforementioned study by the two American think-tanks clearly underlines that the current mood in Germany is not a matter of anti-Americanism but about a German attitude towards military power and the use of this military power. On the one hand, compared to the French and the British, less Germans have problems with US superpower status and Germans have just as many warm feelings towards the US as the British. Following the general election, the only political party in the former Bundestag which is truly anti-American, the post-communist PDS, fell short of the mark and is for the first time in its existence shut out of the parliament. On the other hand, in comparison to the French and the British, Germans are more convinced that the EU should play a regional role and leave global tasks to the US, they are less willing to increase the defence budget and expand economic aid, they are less convinced that it will be the best for the future of their own country if it takes an active role in world affairs and they are much less willing to act militarily even if Iraq does possess weapons of mass destruction.

Nevertheless, the figures in the study also underline that Germany has already come a long way since 1990. Against heavy opposition, respective German governments have gradually stepped up German participation in international military operations. In the last decade Germany has seen its troops in action in Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, Kosovo, the Caucasus, Macedonia and now Afghanistan. Currently, some 9,500 German troops – second only to the US - are involved in military missions abroad, be it in the Balkans or as part of Enduring Freedom. Some 1,300 German troops remain stationed in Kabul and the Netherlands and Germany will furthermore jointly assume lead-nation responsibility in Afghanistan next year. For the time being, Germany has more or less exhausted its capabilities for military engagement beyond homeland defence. Ten years ago, such an engagement would not only have been impossible but also inconceivable.

Thanks to sound political leadership, Germans are slowly getting adjusted to a more robust policy based on the use of force as a means of last resort. Election campaigns are not usually the time when politicians try to change deep-rooted public opinion. I predict that in a decade from now Germany will pursue quite similar defence policies as the UK.

Iraq is not the only issue feeding the usual transatlantic frictions. The Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court and other cases are on our agenda. As a common denominator, Europe and the US in most of these cases agree in principle on the goals but differ about the methods. The increase in the points of friction between the transatlantic partners is also a result of their relations becoming ever closer. Growing economic and social integration and lively cultural exchange help nurture the almost domestic-policy character of these relations. Today people on both sides of the Atlantic are discussing issues that were traditionally the preserve of domestic policy: environmental and consumer protection, domestic security, the death penalty to name but a few. The domestic policy debates impact each other, particularly during election campaigns.

In the future, just as in the past, managing the new agenda of common values and of differences will keep putting the Euro-Atlantic relationship to the test. However, debates on individual issues cannot shake the bedrock of transatlantic friendship and solidarity.

Karten Voigt is the Coordinator of German-American Cooperation in the present German government and a Patron of Atlantic Partnership

Charles Powell writing in *The Times* 11th February 2003

WHEN an American Defence Secretary describes the behaviour of two of Nato's largest and most influential members as "shameful", the term Donald Rumsfeld applied to France and Germany at the weekend, it is time to sit up and take notice. Is Nato in crisis? Is its continued existence under threat?

The issue that has invoked Mr Rumsfeld's justified wrath is the refusal of France and Germany to agree to Nato contingency planning to defend Turkey against Iraq if necessary. It is unprecedented for the Alliance to refuse a fellow member help of this sort. The practical effect will be minimal: the help will be forthcoming anyway from the US and others, outside the formal Nato framework if necessary.

What is extraordinary is that France and Germany should provoke so deep a rift in the Alliance over such a formality. It is hypocrisy on France's part to deny others contingency planning when simultaneously undertaking its own by sending a carrier group towards the Gulf.

For Germany in particular, which has benefited more than any other country from Nato solidarity, it is an extraordinary decision and can only reflect a reckless determination on the part of Gerhard Schröder, the Chancellor, to put domestic political considerations and fealty to his bilateral relationship with President Chirac of France above any calculation of national and European security, let alone transatlantic relations. Konrad Adenauer must be turning in his grave.

The same thinking is evident in the ill-considered German-French proposal to increase the number of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq and provide a UN force to protect them. The effect would be to take the pressure off Saddam to come clean about his weapons of mass destruction. It would turn the inspectors from auditors into detectives, retreating from a regime predicated on co-operation to one that again accepts Iraqi cheating. If Saddam co-operates there is no need for extra inspectors, but without co-operation no increase in inspectors can make a difference. Meanwhile Saddam would have a UN shield behind which he could continue to conceal and develop his weapons.

The impact of all this on American opinion can only be highly damaging. One strongly pro-Nato American senator, speaking at last weekend's Security Policy Conference in Munich, said that if France and Germany continued to obstruct assistance to Turkey and a second UN Resolution, then Iraq could be to Nato and the UN what Abyssinia was to the League of Nations: a death blow.

The danger is greater given the context of continued decline in Europe's defence spending at a time of steep increase in the American defence budget, leaving the US to carry an excessive share of the Nato burden. It is also made worse by the perception, even among traditional Atlanticists in the US, that Europe's nascent security and defence policy is conceived by some European countries as an eventual alternative to Nato and designed in the long term to exclude the US. Current French and German actions serve only to accentuate this damaging impression.

Yet Nato has survived many crises in the past: Suez; Skybolt; the Multilateral Force; endless burden-sharing disputes; French withdrawal from the integrated military structure; deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the 1980s; Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. It succeeded in overcoming these problems because Nato's members recognised that their shared interests and values were too important to be put in jeopardy by short-term disputes or politically painful decisions.

The question now is not whether that perception of shared interests is still strong enough, or whether Nato's European members continue to rely on the organisation to protect their most fundamental security interests.

The flood of applicants to join Nato demonstrates its continuing appeal and relevance. Mr Rumsfeld did us all a favour by distinguishing the new and old Europe. The sense of transatlantic solidarity felt by those new members was very much in evidence at the weekend in Munich, and also in the now celebrated Letter of the Eight, described by an experienced German editor as a diplomatic Pearl Harbor for France and Germany, plus the subsequent and equally powerful statement by the Vilnius Ten. Rather, the question is whether short-term political manoeuvring by a few will do irreparable damage to the fabric of transatlantic trust.

It is hard to believe that, however obsessed they are with short-term manoeuvring and posturing, France and Germany in the last resort want to risk Nato's collapse. But American exasperation is very real. Unless the French and Germans change tack quickly there is a real possibility that US forces will be withdrawn from Europe. Fifth Corps is now being deployed from Germany to the Gulf; it could easily go home

afterwards, like Seventh Corps in 1991 after the Gulf War. Without those forces and the US commitment they embody there is no Nato.

We are in for a difficult few weeks that will severely test the bonds of loyalty that characterise the Alliance. I believe Nato will come through, but M Chirac and Herr Schröder need to remember Winston Churchill's maxim: there is only one thing worse than fighting with one's allies and that is fighting without them.

Lord Powell of Bayswater is former Foreign Affairs and Defence Adviser to the Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major

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PARTNERSHIP IN PERIL
Byline: MICHAEL HOWARD

THE sharp differences over Iraq between France and Germany, on the one hand, and the United States and some other European countries, on the other, has once again brought to the fore the nature and future of the Atlantic partnership.

There have been European charges of unilateralism and worse leveled again the United States. These has been dismissed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as the bleatings of "Old Europe." And there is, undoubtedly, impatience and irritation in Washington and elsewhere at what is seen as bloody-minded obstruction by President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schroder.

Indeed, the latest spat at NATO - with France, Germany and Belgium refusing to act in defence of Turkey - has brought into question the very future of the alliance's military arm.

Yet the truth is that this is only the latest in a growing number of disagreements that have emerged to blight what has been a strong and enduring partnership. There have been arguments over the Kyoto Protocol, U.S. steel imports, European genetically modified food imports, the Middle East - even the death penalty.

More fundamental forces are at work, as well. In America, there has been a westward shift in the center of gravity. It is no accident that Microsoft and Silicon Valley are both on the West Coast. There is a growing, and understandable, preoccupation with China. And demographic changes, too, which loosen the old ties across the Atlantic.

In Europe, there is a move towards greater integration, though Europeans are divided on its desirability. Some of those who want integration would be happy to see a united Europe as a strong partner of the United States. Others are motivated by a desire to set up a rival center of power, however unrealistic some of us may think that to be.

How much does this matter?

Many of us believe that the Atlantic partnership has been, and can still be, a great force for good in the world - benefiting not only the peoples of Europe and America, but those of the world as a whole. If Europe and America work together, all the world's problems become easier to deal with. But if each problem is to become a cockpit of rivalry, with each side trying to score points off the other, the world will become a much more dangerous place.

What can be done to avert a rift? Or, as some think, is it already too late?

For those of us who cherish democracy, free enterprise and the rule of law, values that are shared across the Atlantic - and the contribution which both sides can make to the creation of a better world - the effort must be made. To admit defeat now would be unthinkable. If the political will is there, the partnership can be preserved.

What is needed is a determination to manage the differences that have arisen, and will continue to rise, in such a way as to minimize their impact on the relationship as a whole. We

must try to make sure that individual disputes, even on such vital issues as Iraq, do not bring an end to partnership. We must prevent friction leading to fracture.

This means that decision makers, on both sides of the Atlantic, should always take into account, on issues with trans-Atlantic implications, the effort of their decisions on the relationship. Of course, this will not always be the decisive factor. But if it is always regarded as relevant, there is a good chance that the worst damage can be avoided.

One specific suggestion is that governments, on both sides of the Atlantic, might set up a standing conference of senior officials to identify potential problems before they become real sources of difficulty. Forewarned is forearmed, and early action might diffuse problems that would otherwise become intractable.

The partnership between Europe and America has been of great value to them, and to the world, for 60 years and more. If we work hard at it, we can continue to benefit from it for the next 60.

Michael Howard is a British Conservative MP and former Cabinet Minister. He is founder and Chairman of the Atlantic Partnership (www.atlanticpartnership.com), an organization dedicated to promoting and sustaining the relationship between North America and Europe.

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Les Etats-Unis, l'Otan et l'Europe

Par Henry A Kissinger pour *Le Figaro* December 2002

Le sommet de Prague, destiné à célébrer l'élargissement de l'Otan aux pays Baltes et aux anciennes nations incluses dans le pacte de Varsovie, a marqué le triomphe des objectifs originels de l'Alliance et a été également l'occasion de réfléchir aux évolutions de longue durée. L'Otan a été créée il y a plus d'un demi-siècle afin de protéger ses membres contre la menace d'une agression, et spécialement contre la menace d'une invasion de l'Europe occidentale par les Soviétiques. Cette menace s'étant évanouie, tout au moins à l'horizon d'un avenir prévisible, l'Alliance atlantique ne doit plus tant s'engager dans un processus d'élargissement que dans un processus de transformation profonde.

L'Otan ressemble désormais plus à une organisation de sécurité comme les Nations unies qu'à une alliance traditionnelle.

Une alliance définit un casus belli, une ligne de fracture et une série d'obligations spécifiques. Elle assume une menace explicite. En revanche, les organismes de sécurité collective caractérisent la menace au cas par cas et négocient, pour autant qu'elle existe, la méthode de résistance en fonction des circonstances. Les crises successives qui se sont déroulées à Berlin pendant la guerre froide ont été surmontées par la méthode de l'alliance ; la campagne antiterroriste conduite en septembre 2001 a été menée comme un sujet de sécurité collective, nos alliés agissant dans le cadre de leurs prérogatives nationales au cas par cas. L'Otan, en tant qu'institution, n'a pas été engagée.

Cette transformation tacite crée potentiellement deux fractures à l'intérieur de l'Alliance : entre l'Europe orientale et l'Europe occidentale, ainsi qu'entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis.

La plupart des membres d'Europe occidentale voient dans l'adhésion de la Russie à l'Otan une simple question de temps. Dans l'intervalle, une sorte de juste milieu a été

aménagée, donnant à la Russie la possibilité d'intégrer la machine consultative de l'Otan, ce qui, aux yeux des nouveaux membres, affaiblit les buts de l'Alliance. L'attitude de ces derniers est celle de l'Europe occidentale à ses débuts. Après avoir vécu sous la loi russe pendant des décennies, les nouveaux membres de l'Otan voient dans cette alliance un bon moyen de prévenir le retour d'agressions ou de pressions provenant de l'est de l'Europe. Contrairement à un certain nombre de leurs partenaires occidentaux, ils cherchent à étendre les engagements internationaux de l'Amérique, non à les restreindre.

Parallèlement, le nouvel environnement international modifie la relation entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis. Aussi longtemps qu'a prévalu une conception uniforme de la menace, l'Europe était incitée à poursuivre des interventions dictées par l'impératif de sécurité. Mais, en l'absence d'une perception commune de cette menace, les nations européennes subordonnent toujours davantage leur engagement militaire aux priorités de la politique intérieure. Depuis la chute du mur de Berlin, on a observé un déclin permanent de leurs dépenses militaires. Au même moment, l'effort massif de défense américain n'encourage pas la cohésion des alliés, car il est largement perçu, en Europe, comme une tentative de se mêler d'affaires qui contredisent les intérêts européens. Cet effort porte à son paroxysme la peur exprimée par beaucoup d'Européens d'un monde unipolaire.

L'Amérique, d'autre part, s'est concentrée sur la création d'une force d'intervention relativement réduite, comptant 20 000 hommes placés sous l'autorité de l'Otan. Mais l'avenir de l'Otan dépend moins de sa structure militaire que de la capacité de ses membres à développer des objectifs politiques communs. Or, dans ce domaine, les raisons de nourrir des inquiétudes ne manquent pas. Les médias européens et un certain nombre de figures politiques continuent à présenter les Etats-Unis comme le pays de la peine de mort, d'un capitalisme rapace, d'une diplomatie unilatérale et d'une mentalité de cow-boy. Même le consensus sur l'Irak lors du sommet de Prague, à la fin du mois dernier, risque de voler en éclats lorsque le besoin apparaîtra de définir ce qui constitue une violation matérielle des résolutions de l'ONU et quels remèdes peuvent lui être apportés.

Simultanément, la plupart des gens, aux Etats-Unis, voient dans l'Europe une région marquée par un neutralisme naissant, qui se repose sur les capacités de défense américaine et sur la recherche de sa sécurité par la substitution du multilatéralisme à ses responsabilités d'allié. Il y a, par conséquent, une insistance croissante pour que les Etats-Unis soient le seul arbitre des intérêts globaux. On est là au coeur du différend entre multilatéralisme et unilatéralisme. Le temps est venu de remettre ce débat en perspective.

Les Européens n'ont pas plus l'ambition que les Américains de subordonner la perception de leurs intérêts vitaux aux intérêts abstraits du multilatéralisme, comme en témoigne leur comportement à l'égard de la PAC. Le multilatéralisme européen se manifeste souvent sous les formes inédites d'un nationalisme moral complaisant envers lui-même. Pour sa part, l'Amérique définit ses intérêts nationaux dans des termes plus stratégiques.

L'Europe met provisoirement entre parenthèses ses préoccupations concernant le fonctionnement de nouvelles institutions telles que la Cour pénale internationale, pour

une part en raison de la faible priorité qu'elle donne à la politique étrangère. Les Etats-Unis sont concernés par les retombées immédiates d'une institution dotée d'une charte vague, de procédures non codifiées et qui ne se prête à aucun système de checks and balances susceptible d'affecter la plupart des Américains engagés dans des responsabilités globales.

Quant à la colère européenne au sujet de la notion d'attaque préventive, elle concerne sans doute plus la procédure que le contenu. Mise en avant comme partie intégrante de la stratégie nationale des Etats-Unis depuis septembre, cette doctrine implique deux types de questionnements, l'un sur sa validité propre et l'autre sur la manière dont elle a été présentée. L'Administration a eu tout à fait raison d'affirmer que les caractéristiques définissant le système international traditionnel étaient fondamentalement remises en cause par l'idéologie et les technologies contemporaines. La menace terroriste s'oppose à la cohésion sociale et les armes de destruction massive peuvent altérer l'équilibre des pouvoirs et constituer une menace de destruction, d'abord au travers des équipements industriels d'un Etat souverain. Dans ces conditions, les victimes potentielles ne peuvent pas attendre que la menace devienne réalité. L'attaque préventive est inhérente à la technologie et à l'idéologie du système international du XXI^e siècle.

Mais l'Administration s'est trompée en présentant ce qui est une réalité internationale comme une exception américaine. Nos alliés n'accepteront pas de laisser à un allié le soin de définir ce qu'est la stratégie préventive, aussi proche et puissant soit-il. Ce ne serait pas non plus servir les intérêts américains que d'encourager chaque Etat à définir cette stratégie dans des termes purement nationaux. La solution serait de réduire le fossé entre substance et procédure, pour définir ensemble, du moins avec nos alliés de longue date, les quelques principes de la préemption. Pour ce faire, il est essentiel que nos alliés fassent l'effort de ne pas vouloir systématiquement restreindre les Etats-Unis et qu'ils prennent au sérieux le besoin que nous avons de redéfinir la menace qui nous entoure. Le débat doit porter sur le seuil à partir duquel le droit de se défendre peut être appliqué.

Les Etats-Unis doivent résister à la sirène qui leur chante de fonder leur politique étrangère sur une conception hégémonique du pouvoir. Beaucoup des problèmes qui affectent l'ordre du monde ne sont pas susceptibles d'être résolus par la voie militaire. L'histoire montre que, tôt ou tard, tout pays puissant doit disposer de forces compensatoires. Et sur ce point j'y insiste dès aujourd'hui les Etats-Unis doivent comprendre qu'ils ne pourront régler seuls tous les problèmes internationaux sans s'épuiser physiquement et psychologiquement. Nous allons avoir besoin d'alliés, et les pays qui partagent le plus nos valeurs et notre histoire sont les pays de l'Otan. Bien que la sagesse des nations refuse le concept de choc des civilisations, ce sont bien les sociétés occidentales qui font face ensemble au radicalisme de croisades menées par une certaine version de l'islam. L'ultime défi de la politique étrangère américaine est d'abandonner sa vision dominante du pouvoir au profit d'une responsabilité partagée.

De la même manière, l'Europe, pour son salut, doit résister à la tentation de faire cavalier seul. L'Alliance a besoin d'une déclaration expliquant plus clairement ce qu'on entend par une politique étrangère « européenne » et elle a aussi besoin de pacifier ses groupes de pression internes. L'Europe doit avoir le droit de se

désolidariser de ses partenaires. Mais elle doit se rendre compte que les tentatives américaines pour remodeler la carte du monde témoignent d'un sens général des responsabilités, et non des préventions psychologiques de tel ou tel dirigeant. Dans un tel contexte, le débat entre le multilatéralisme et l'unilatéralisme revêt une autre dimension. Le premier atteint son but ultime dans sa recherche d'un consensus général et global, le second insiste sur les intérêts particuliers des nations. Mais l'Otan, pour avoir du sens, a besoin d'un nouvel équilibre entre ces deux extrêmes. Est-ce possible ? Ou sommes-nous condamnés à nous perdre de vue ? A l'heure qu'il est, nul ne peut prévoir les développements futurs de notre relation, mais l'avenir de notre civilisation rend cet effort indispensable.

Ancien secrétaire d'Etat américain. (c) 2002, Tribune Media Services International (traduit par Anna Topaloff).

Dr Henry Kissinger is a Patron of Atlantic Partnership

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Round 1 Goes to Mr. Big

By JOSEF JOFFE

HAMBURG, Germany — Is the latest trans-Atlantic flare-up yet another "Whither NATO?" crisis, like those that have roiled the West for decades with the precision of a German cuckoo clock? No, this time it is war (and not the real war against Iraq, which hasn't even begun). In fact, it is two wars: one that pits Europe against Europe, and another that pits a French-German "axis" against the United States.

It's been a tough stretch for the leaders of the "old" Europe — Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany and President Jacques Chirac of France. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's presentation at the United Nations on Wednesday was found so damning by other leaders around the continent that 10 Eastern European countries — including five set to join NATO next year — issued a joint statement that they would "stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction."

This statement came just days after a missive, splattered across the morning papers in Britain and Italy, Portugal and Spain, Denmark and Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, by those countries' leaders that ever so politely told Messrs. Chirac and Schröder to back off. In its diplomatese, that message said of the Iraqi threat: "Our goal is to safeguard world peace and security by ensuring that this regime gives up its weapons of mass destruction. Our governments have a common responsibility to face this threat."

Decoded, however, these two statements read, "We are not amused that Paris and Berlin are trying to gang up on the United States in the name of Europe." No, there was no explicit call to war against Baghdad. Nor did the "Euro 8" or the "Vilnius 10" cheer America's wider goals — regime change or democratization. But the message was clear: Saddam Hussein does have to be disarmed, if need be, by force.

For now, the French-German duo that spent the last few weeks trying to isolate the United States is itself isolated. But this can change tomorrow, as history is accelerating. The real significance of the drama is the collapse of Europe's pretensions to an independent, let alone cohesive, foreign policy.

Essentially, the French and the Germans tried to harness a diplomatic coalition against the so-called hyperpower. They acted as if they viewed the exercise of American might as a greater threat than Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. This is curious, since if Iraq were given time to develop a North Korea-like program, its missiles could reach Berlin and Paris a lot sooner than the urban centers of America. But it makes perfect sense if we recall the great watershed of postwar Europe, Christmas Day 1991, when the Soviet Union committed suicide by self-dissolution.

Suddenly, there was nobody left to contain and constrain Mr. Big. This does not sit well with the Europeans, especially since George W. Bush told them again in his State of the Union address that the "course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."

Naturally, the Europeans felt more comfortable in the past with Gulliver Bound, although it was nice to be able to untie him just in case the other superpower, the Soviet Union, turned nasty. But that strategic dependence, which used to squelch every "Whither NATO?" crisis in the past, is a decade gone.

No German chancellor would have dared provoke the United States while Soviet shock troops were ensconced 25 miles outside Hamburg. Nor would the French have brazenly threatened a veto in the Security Council while depending on the free security provided by six American divisions in Germany. Still, as the messages from the rest of the continent indicate, today's Europe as a whole is not ready to balance Mr. Big. It is not yet willing to seek an identity apart from and against the United States. The Europeans know that they can't even clean up their own backyard — in Bosnia, in Kosovo — without help from the U.S. Cavalry. They also know that Saddam Hussein is a real problem, as is North Korea.

And so it is quite useful to have Mr. Big in the game, even though he does throw his weight around a bit too much for comfort. Indeed, the more the Europeans pride themselves in having transcended Hobbesian politics in favor of "civilian power" and "friendly persuasion," the more they need American muscle and will as reinsurance. Europe's goodness depends not on the European Union, but on the Pentagon.

So has President Bush won the game? No, just one round. The Germans, who have defied Washington with the loudest "no" to the war, may lose for now because, as Mr. Schröder has conceded, he does "not know what the French will do." His good friend Mr. Chirac, leaving his options open, has dispatched the aircraft carrier Charles de

Gaulle to the Middle East. Once the first American cruise missiles hit the bunkers of the Iraqi Republican Guard, France will surely join in.

Further down the road, however, the United States does face a problem: eventually the lesser nations aren't going to take it any more. What the administration fails to appreciate is the Spider-Man principle: "With great power comes great responsibility." The bigger Mr. Big gets, the more trust he must inspire in others. Just one practical point: once American power pushes Saddam Hussein out, who is going to win the peace in Iraq, if not a vast coalition of the willing ready to secure order and reconstruction?

This French-German attempt to gang up on Mr. Big seems to have backfired — undermined by the inconvenient fact that there still are at least 18 other European countries determined to have a voice. Yet the other major players will break ranks again unless the greatest power since Rome learns to respect a simple maxim: To lead is to heed. This is not the counsel of wimpishness, but of wisdom.

Josef Joffe is editor of the German weekly Die Zeit.

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Bismarck must be spinning in his grave at Germany's blunder

By Josef Joffe

(Filed: 12/02/2003) The Daily Telegraph

How the once-mighty have stumbled! In the old days (not that they were such good days), the Germans simply used to overrun Belgium - and triggered two world wars in the process. Now they hide behind this tiny country in order to kick Uncle Sam in the shin.

Though Berlin did not formally veto Nato planning for the defence of Turkey in case of an Iraqi war, German Nato diplomats earlier this week egged on France and Belgium to say "Non".

Making a mouse roar, to do in Nato? This is a new one in the annals of diplomacy, and it adds inanity to injury. Or, to quote the French master cynic Talleyrand, who served both Napoleon and the restored monarchy: "This was worse than a crime, it was a mistake." The crime, though not necessarily with malice aforethought, is a blow that could yet do for the world's most successful and enduring alliance of all time.

The message of the veto by Belgium et al is this: the alliance is now a la carte; it is up to us to decide whether a threatened member shall be protected or not. Indeed, we will veto even the planning for such a contingency under Article 4. This clause of the Nato treaty allows a member state to ask for consultations on what the alliance might do if an impending threat actually does materialise.

Not such a big thing, you might think - all we're talking about is the little matter of dispatching a handful of Patriot missiles to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Turkey. Such a move would prejudice nothing; it would merely send a sorely needed message to Baghdad to the effect: "Don't even go there."

The implied signal from Brussels now reads: the coalition that so effectively deterred a Soviet attack for 50 years has now become a contingency; we may help each other, and then we may not because we have other fish to fry.

As of this week, all 19 members of the alliance will begin to reshape their calculations. In the next crunch, it will not be "all for one, and one for all", but "each for himself". This will be the end of the alliance as we knew it.

If this is the crime, what is the mistake?

The Germans and - much more subtly - the French have been desperately trying to stop America's and Britain's war against Saddam. Their reasons may be sound or even honourable, but the effect is the opposite of intelligent statecraft.

Both France and Germany subscribe to the goal, enshrined in 17 UN resolutions, of disarming Saddam. Yet how could the rupture of a common Western front serve this purpose? Indeed, war avoidance, which Paris and Berlin so desperately seek, will be served far better by increasing, not by reducing, the pressure on Saddam.

This duo, plus Belgium, have arrayed themselves on the side of Saddam. They give him hope against hope - that, somehow, he will be able to escape from the UN siege with his capacity for making weapons of mass destruction essentially untouched. Not a smart move.

Such are the insights that even the most basic course in diplomacy teaches to young foreign ministry acolytes, but then, neither Bismarck nor Talleyrand is running foreign policy in Berlin or Paris these days. These wily manipulators of men and nations would have asked a more fundamental question: "Are we willing to sacrifice Nato to our attempt to tie down the 'hyperpower'?"

On closer inspection, they would have answered "Nein" and "Non". They would have reasoned thus. First, if we want to take on Mr Big in earnest, we had better make sure that we can stay in the game after the first few moves. Since we don't have the chips, we must add to our smallish pile by recruiting reliable allies. Belgium? Scratch that, for we need heavier munitions than those pricey chocolates concocted by Neuhaus and Godiva. Let's see, is there anybody else?

Alas, there isn't. As the open letter of the "Wall Street Eight" and the declaration of the "Vilnius 10" showed, the rest of Europe is not amused. The east Europeans obviously march to a different tune. The lyrics read: "The closer we are geographically to Russia, the closer we must be politically to America." For only the "hyperpower" can reliably protect us against a resurgent Russia.

But there is more. Those east Europeans have only recently recouped their sovereignty, and so they are far less willing than Germany or Belgium to yield it to Brussels. And they are even less willing to yield it to a Franco-German directoire.

Better to huddle under the umbrella of a remote superpower than to submit to nearby medium powers that are much better placed to meddle in the affairs of the smaller European countries. Indeed, so their reasoning goes, we want Mr Big in the game to

give us some leverage against the "Old Europe". Interestingly enough, these motives have also shaped the calculations of Spain and Italy.

Which leaves Russia. Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder have demonstratively sidled up to Vladimir Putin. All three have proclaimed that they "favour the continuation of the inspections", which is a polite way of saying no to the war.

Let the inspections drag on into the summer, and the window for war closes. For it is hard to see how those Anglo-American forces would stay in place until next January and beyond. Worse, let those troops go, and Saddam can defy the UN for ever.

This is a gamble the German chancellor may well lose. Unlike Mr Schröder, Mr Chirac and Mr Putin have not tied their hands; indeed, the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is well on its way toward the Middle East. In the end, neither France nor Russia will risk their American connection, let alone a seat at the table where the post-war fate of Iraq will be thrashed out.

Germany as the odd man out? This must be the nightmare now wafting through the chancellor's office. Can it be banished? Yes, if coldly calculated interest prevails. It whispers ever so loudly: "Don't mess with Mr Big unless the stronger battalions are on your side." Belgium is not enough.

The author is editor of the German weekly Die Zeit

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How to win hearts and minds

John Weston believes the US and UK must work closely together to make sure that any action against Iraq is multilateral

Saddam Hussein's mountain of documents now awaiting analysis by UN experts has temporarily flummoxed those in hot pursuit. It has thus bought a little more time before a final reckoning is visited upon him. He is playing a weak hand with customary tactical adroitness.

But the underlying realities have not changed. Despite seasonal injunctions to moderation by respected generals, ambassadors and bishops here, we should not allow ourselves to fall prey to the liberal illusion that, so long as no clear or present danger from Iraq is seen to threaten directly the national security of the UK or the US, international inaction is a cost-free option. The evidence of Iraq's proscribed mass weapons programmers during the 1990s was compelling. The litany of Iraq's defiance and deception of the UN over more than a decade has set a new standard of cynicism for unscrupulous world leaders. It bodes ill for law and order in the years ahead.

That said, the case for preferring pre-emptive military action against Iraq to traditional policies of containment and deterrence depends on at least four important conditions being first fulfilled. These bear on intelligence, authority, support and consistency. The record on these so far falls short of the cumulative weight needed to carry political conviction and to underpin a safe cost-benefit analysis for the use of force.

Even with maximum diligence by UN inspectors in the paper chase, it is unlikely that any breakthrough on such technical issues as the material balance for key biological agents or chemical-weapon precursors will be dramatic enough by itself to persuade public opinion at large that Saddam Hussein has once again been caught in flagrante; especially if key people or materials have meanwhile been moved out of Iraq. The supposed connection between Iraq and al-Qa'eda-type terrorism has not been demonstrated. What is needed is either a step-change in Western readiness to disclose high-grade intelligence publicly, or a major new defection, or the appearance of a well-placed Iraqi official.

Since the unanimous passing of Security Council resolution 1441, the legitimisation of any forceful international action against Iraq should Saddam Hussein remain defiant has certainly been reinforced. And there is anyway a case for saying that, since the ceasefire in resolution 687 in 1991 has been negated by the Iraqi refusal to comply fully ever since, the original authority of resolution 678 of 1990, which gave the green light to military force against Iraq, still stands.

However, support for force from a coalition of participating nations and within public opinion, both in the region itself and in the West, still looks thin. Despite having taken the issue to the UN, the US is still perceived as acting primarily in imperial mode.

There are two main ways to strengthen support for military action. The first is to define and delimit the scope of such possible action much more clearly. If the case can be built for using military force solely in order to disarm Iraq of its proscribed weapons programmes in a surgically precise way, but clearly stopping short of major invasion to secure regime change, tolerance and support would be likely to grow.

Second, the single most important factor in shifting opinion would be clear evidence that the US is using its political and financial muscle on both parties for early movement towards a just settlement in the Israel/Palestine context leading to a responsible Palestine state. Arguably, the US President has never been in a stronger position to do so. However much Americans may wish to avoid this logic, it is the factor that most inhibits domestic and international support for strong action by a US-led coalition against Iraq.

As for the British and our fellow Europeans, we would do well to avoid facile attitudinising towards the US. A strong underlying co-operation between both sides of the Atlantic is more essential than ever. As the US recovers from the shock of 9/11 and rethinks its strategic posture as the sole superpower, we should seek by every means to encourage Americans into further multilateral and collective endeavour, not risk driving them into global solipsism. This will mean compromise, understanding and prudent support, sometimes in difficult circumstances, as the price for bringing influence to bear when it matters.

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Sir John Weston is a former British ambassador to the United Nations, and before that to Nato. And an Atlantic Partnership panelist.

It's folly for U.S. to go it alone

By DAVID HOWELL

LONDON -- "Go it alone" is clearly the prevailing mood in Washington. Officials and commentators alike argue that with the United States' overwhelming military might and Europe's alleged weakness, the world must be set right by unilateral American action, and the international community can either like it or lump it.

There is much to admire and respect about America today. There is no doubt that its economic vigor is unending, that its military spending dwarfs all other nations and that it remains the vital ally for all freedom-loving countries.

Yet could it be that in this case the U.S. attitude is resting on a fatally flawed analysis? Could it be that this vast American power and strength contains, in modern conditions, a kind of weakness, while the weakness of Europe, about which Washington experts speak so disparagingly, is in practice a source of strength.

Such a paradoxical possibility does not seem even to have entered the mind of, for example, Robert Kagan, whose essay on the widening trans-Atlantic power gap is said to have had great influence on the current administration. [The article was published in our Autumn Newsletter and can be read on the website]. For him there is no doubt that America is so powerful it can do anything it wants, while militarily weak Europe flops around trying to use diplomacy, compromise and negotiation with the world's dark forces, since it has no alternative.

Yet there are good reasons why this whole thesis may have got things upside down. Here are some of them.

* Against the asymmetry of terror, sheer military might is very little use. The U.S. may have 13 gigantic carrier fleets and thousands of troops billeted in camps across half of Asia, but that does not mean it has been able to catch Osama bin Laden or pin down the numerous terrorist networks that coil in and out of each and almost every society. Equating military size with power has already been shown to be naive.

* Weapons technology increasingly favours the Davids against the Goliaths and the little ships against the big galleons. Smallness can be strength, as the British know very well from their history. Today, one man, armed with light, shoulder-held equipment, can destroy a 30-ton tank or bring down a \$60 million aircraft. One terrorist with a briefcase can paralyse cities or poison millions.

* However brilliant (and expensive) the military's gadgetry and hardware, operations ultimately depend on the morale, agility and commitment of the men and women of whom a country's armed forces are composed. Modern U.S. forces seem troubled by low morale, excessive fear of casualties and the need for elephantine support facilities

to keep one man on the front line. Europe's "weak" little armies could turn out to be far more effective in meeting today's unconventional security demands.

* Addressing today's threats to global peace and stability, while at the same time protecting one's own national and local interests (which are increasingly the same thing), requires the deepest and most sophisticated sort of intelligence -- the kind that really penetrates into the heart of local cultures, customs and ways of life.

U.S. writer Ernest Hemingway once remarked that the only way to know about coming revolutions or uprisings was to listen to what people were actually saying to each other in the souks, not what they were saying to government officials or foreigners or visiting reporters. This is the kind of work at which the "weak" Europeans excel, especially the British, while the "powerful" American agencies find it hard to follow the plot.

* As a general principle, size increases vulnerability while it reduces flexibility. The factors that finally sealed the fate of the dinosaurs may be in dispute, but no one denies that their cumbersome size and lack of manoeuvrability helped bring them down.

* Since the global network is a reality, individual nations, however large and dominant, must rely on each other to make any project succeed, whether it is military, financial, commercial or technical. The American option of "going it alone," backed by the unconstrained American power about which Kagan and others in Washington talk so freely, does not really exist. More than ever we all live in a single security network. For all its size, the U.S. cannot operate round the world or even defend its own soil without the most intimate cooperation of the "weak" European nations.

Ironically, the one way in which the theory of European "weakness" might be validated would be by listening to the advice of Kagan, and many others, on the future structure of the Continent. If Europe's leaders were unwise enough to succumb to the "bloc" mentality and try to create a single "dinosaur" superpower in attempted emulation (and rivalry) of America, they would destroy the very diversity and ingenuity that Europe's diversity brings to the global security scene. Such a backward-looking, "two bloc" view of the world would also ignore -- with total unrealism -- the key roles of Russia, Japan and the rest of Asia in the global network.

Regrettably, influential European voices still call for such a retrograde step. Yet it would surely reinforce the "weakness" that the Americans wrongly diagnose among Europe's nations and add further to the genuine weakness of the American giant, which is the paradoxical, other side of its strength.

If this admittedly complex message can somehow reach the U.S. leadership, then the trans-Atlantic relationship, far from collapsing under current strains, will become a more intimate and subtle partnership than ever.

The article appeared in the Japan Times, in September 2002.

David Howell is a former British Cabinet minister and former chairman of the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. He is now a member of the House of Lords and an Atlantic Partnership Panellist

Europe vis-à-vis America: How to be Smart Allies- by Christoph Bertram

Earlier in the year, a shrewd Canadian diplomat at one of the many meetings on European-American relations posed a question which has since rankled in my mind and has become even more pertinent since: “Do you Europeans want to be allies or a counterweight to the US?” The Europeans present answered with what has been their credo for the past forty years or so, namely that a strong transatlantic partnership requires a confident and strong Europe; counterweight-Europe was thus essential for alliance-Europe.

This, however, increasingly lacks conviction. At best, it is along-term vision, at worst an alibi. Perhaps one day, the nations of the European Union will have grown so close together that they have become a single strategic actor on the international scene, with coherent policies and both the will and the means to implement them. But in the long in-between years until that lucky day, the states that make up the European Union will have to accept that they lack what it takes to be a counterweight. They will have to decide whether they want to be allies or not. And since not being allied to the strongest country in the world is not very wise, they will have to be good allies.

What Europe lacks

For proud Europeans, this may sound like a call for submission. Does not the European Union even before its new round of enlargement count more citizens than the United States, have a higher GNP, is a trade power second to none with the Euro a financial heavy-weight now equalling the Dollar?? The answer to all these questions is „yes“. But while these are major and impressive achievements which qualify the Union as a superpower in economic and financial terms, they do not - at least not yet - translate into strategic power.

At first glance, this is puzzling. Economic and financial matters play a much greater role in international affairs today than they did during the Cold War years. The European Union has the largest market in the world, it can bloc the work of the World Trade Organisation, it is the largest donor of development assistance, and without its consent no struggling economy will be rescued from financial crisis. In these domains, the Union and its members are America’s indispensable partner, were the mighty US unwilling to take their interest into account it would hurt its own interests. Significantly, it is here that America is a committed multilateralist – it needs Europe’s consent and Europe’s resources.

There are three reasons, however, why this considerable political and economic weight which Europe undoubtedly has does not translate into strategic power for the Union: the lack of military clout, a highly inefficient way of decision-making, and the absence of any real ambition to play a strategic role.

Of the three, the lack of military might is the most mentioned and the least important. For one, the member states of the European Union are not exactly military dwarfs.

Together they have more men under arms than the US and spend more money on defence than any country other than America – half a billion dollars per day compared to the US daily billion. The problem here is not that they spend too little but that they spend it in the most inefficient and wasteful way: for 15 separate national defence establishments, for soldiers they cannot deploy and a mushroomed military infrastructure with little or no relevance to the new military tasks. The advances made by the much acclaimed European Security and Defence Policy have been significant in institutions but modest in substance, with national defence bureaucracies fighting a determined and largely successful rearguard action to prevent real role specialisation among Europe's armies, not to mention any serious pooling of her considerable military resources. For another, individual European states such as Britain do enjoy a degree of strategic respect despite military capabilities dwarfed by those of the United States. It is clearly not so much the size of the armed forces a nation or a group of nations can field but the willingness and ability to use them which conveys this respect. A European Union willing and able to make decisive use of even a much smaller force than its members dispose of together would indeed be regarded as a serious international player.

This points to the major deficiency of the Union: its decision-making process is notoriously slow when it comes to policy areas where member states maintain control. Significantly, it is in the areas where the Commission can act as a supranational authority – in competition and, to a regrettably lesser extent, common commercial policy – that the Union has the greatest international impact and is recognized as a real player. In foreign and security matters, however, the Council, not the Commission is in the driving seat, and that means in essence that the government of each individual state reserves the right to agree not only on the decision in principle but also on each step of the implementation. While this may do when it comes to dealing with structural issues, multilateral fora or supporting a lengthy peace-process, it is a recipe for wavering and half-heartedness in an acute crisis.

European governments are aware of this deficiency. There are hopes that perhaps the Convention currently drafting a constitution might offer solutions to the problem. Various proposals are being considered – from creating the post of a EU President to be elected for a number of years, to elevating the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, currently held by the Spaniard Xavier Solana, to that of a formal “EU Foreign Minister”, anchored both in the Council Secretariat and in the Commission, and to taking decisions in this field by qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers. All have considerable merit and a wise Convention will opt for all of them.

Yet none of them will remove what is – and perhaps must be – the veto each member can cast when it comes to follow up by force what has been announced as policy – the central prerequisite of strategic power. For the foreseeable future, no national government in the EU will delegate to a non-national body the decision of using military force, even of committing members to a foreign policy towards parts of the world in which the use of force might become advisable. While the institutional innovations emanating from the Convention will facilitate the Union's international presence they will not, as in the case of competition and commercial policy, leave the decision to the Commission or to any other supranational body.

The Union, therefore, is unlikely to develop an efficient method for defending its international interest. This is the more striking because already the interests of its members are increasingly aligned, often even identical. A decade ago, the beginning of the Balkan Wars revealed a disunited Europe, in total contrast to the consensus today. The same can be said for relations with the United States or Russia, for interests in the Middle East or Africa: while the foreign policies of bigger member states still differ on procedure and style, they are quite similar on substance. In addition, all members, big and small, have come to realize that it is only when they operate under the European flag that they can hope to have much influence in the world; going it alone reduces the chance of success. Yet they have so far been unable to create the mechanism which could turn the alignment of interests and the value of joint action into operational reality.

Power without ambition

A more effective mechanism must and will one day be introduced. But even then the Union will never be able to emulate the unity of decision practiced by a traditional power. In contrast to the formation of the United States of America, European integration is not about turning former colonies into an “ever closer union” but highly developed and proud states. These states have lost much of the sovereignty to act on their own but they are unlikely to provide their Union with the sovereignty of acting for them in the way states used to.

This is something to regret but also to welcome. After all, the European Union is the only “power” in history whose geographical extension has not caused fears or the formation of counter-alliances. From the original six member states of 1952, it has progressed to 15 today and will soon count 25. Instead of being resented by those still outside, it is being regarded as the most attractive club to join. If it were ever to become a traditional strategic power, it would face the resistance experienced by other, earlier empires.

The Union will never to become a traditional strategic power. It will probably be able one day to muster its own defence. It will also muster what is necessary to project stability beyond its borders through non-military means – and in the wider Europe is remarkably successful in this respect – as well as provide military forces for peace-keeping and even limited peace-making in crisis regions. But it will not be able to generate the unitary determination to undertake aggressive military action or, as the US is now contemplating, military pre-emption against a possible enemy.

True, the latter may exceed what is required of a serious international actor anyway; after all, few other powers in the world dispose of such a wide range of instruments as that enjoyed by the European Union to shape their international environment. But here the third European deficit in terms of exerting power and influence beyond the EU territory comes in: a lack of ambition. European governments and political elites may pass all sorts of resolutions, write voluminous communiqués of how to treat the ills of the wider world and even donate considerable amounts of public money to deserving causes. But below the surface of caring lies a great reluctance to feel responsible.

This as a general European phenomenon, familiar to small and larger states alike, displayed by Germany and France and Britain and Spain and Italy no less than by

Denmark, the Netherlands or Greece. It may be excused but cannot be explained by the challenges of EU enlargement; no doubt the historic process of bringing in the new democracies of the rest of Europe into the Union and helping to stabilize the wider region alone demands that most of the energies and resources of member states be focused on their immediate environment. Yet surprisingly the fact that the enlarged Union will soon - with the inclusion of Cyprus - extend its borders to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, that it will border on Syria, Iraq and Iran should Turkey join has not produced the ambition to address the strategic consequences that go with this extension.

This general inclination to leave the strategic problems out there to others is probably the consequence of having lived with American leadership for so long and so well. For half a century Europe's political class has become accustomed to the fact that the main initiatives and decisions are taken by the United States; European governments have practiced a habit of praising or criticizing them, welcoming or resenting them, and in the end to go along. When you know that someone else is coping with your problems, there is no incentive to develop the mentality and the capability to do so yourself. Europeans have been good and critical backseat drivers: they are aware they cannot get out of the car; they know the rules of traffic, they understand the mechanics of the motor – but they have never driven the car itself.

The truth is they are not particularly keen to do so. For Europe's political class to leave initiative, decision and implementation largely to the United States has been a sensible arrangement during the Cold War years. It has remained a convenient arrangement since then. After all, even when the United States acted unilaterally in the wider world, it usually served the interests of its allies as well, and if it did not do so fully, the difference was insufficient to outweigh the disadvantages of opposing or obstructing America's efforts. In return for the US looking after the conflicts in the wider world, the Europeans could concentrate on building up their Union, enlarging it and securing its flanks in the Balkans.

In sum, therefore, the Union is no counterweight to the power of its mighty ally, because it has neither ambition nor the mechanism to play such a role. This does not mean that the Union is powerless. But this power will have to be employed within the alliance with the United States, and Europe can only hope to have any influence on US strategy if it is not totally opposed to America's objectives and actions.

America, the tough ally

That was convenient to European governments and acceptable to European publics during the Cold War and the decade that followed it. More encouraging, the latter part of the 1990's suggested not only a strengthening commitment on both parts of the Atlantic to the common alliance and its evolution, it also witnessed a growing compatibility of interests between Europe and the United States. In the Balkans, the US finally accepted the need to play a constructive role instead of frustrating European initiatives. In the Middle East, the Clinton Administration was actively and imaginatively seeking a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Europeans and Americans pursued very similar policies towards Jeltsin's Russia. They stood together in Kosovo, Nato's first and first successful war ever; they created and gave life to the new World Trade Organisation. While there were differences - Clinton's America was opposed to the project of an International Criminal Court and unimpressed by the

Kyoto Protocol - and the growing gap in military capabilities suggested growing difficulties in joint military operations, the common ground was never in doubt.

This was to change fundamentally with the Administration of President George W. Bush. Somehow, Americans seemed to wake up to the fact that there were really Number One, and their new leadership was determined to make aggressive use of this power to pursue, if need be unilaterally and with the certainty that the Europeans had no other choice than that of going along, what were seen as America's primary interests. When September 11 shocked America and the world and the President asked for help from US allies in the "war against terror", Europeans hoped this would put a more co-operative stamp on US foreign policy. They soon found out that they were wrong – instead of changing the basic course of the Bush Administration, it confirmed the new team in its views and provided them with the domestic support to pursue their goal even more forcefully.

European publics only really woke up to this once the Administration revealed its strategy of forcing a change of regime in Iraq. But for long the signs had been ominous: Nato, once the coalition of choice, became one among many – "the mission defines the coalition", as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld likes to put it. The new national security doctrine, formally unveiled in September 2002 but outlined earlier in the year by President Bush himself, dismisses the concepts of strategy that for decades formed the transatlantic consensus: deterrence, containment, arms control and international law. Instead, the United States, faced with the threat of international terrorism and weapons proliferation, reserves the right to use force however and whenever it sees itself threatened, including the first use of nuclear weapons, unencumbered by international covenants. And it advocates openly the removal of dictatorial and suppressive regimes particularly those possessing weapons of mass destruction, in Iraq and elsewhere, to promote democracy around the globe, if need be by force.

On world order – a world apart

This concept of international order in the 21st century could not be further away from the one strongly held by America's European allies. Based on the successful experience of détente when multilateral contact across the once Iron Curtain facilitated regime change across Eastern Europe as well as on European integration, the other and most successful experience of multilateralism, Europeans are convinced that this order can only be built on inclusiveness, on common and binding rules and institutions, and on international law. The West whose common notions of security and order were once the cornerstone of the European-American relationship, is now deeply divided, more so than at any time in its history. It is a division less about the new threats than about the new world order that can deal with them.

And yet the difference is one America's allies will have to bear, in their own interest. To cancel the alliance with America is not a serious option for serious European governments. For one, it would mean the collapse of European efforts for a more united foreign and security policy: forced to choose between an imperfect European security union and the alliance with the US, many, probably most EU members will side with the latter, a trend which will be further reinforced by the admittance of new members into the Western organisations from the former Soviet empire who want to join a Europe and Nato precisely because of the US link.

For another, it would deprive Europe of a voice in the US debate – and hence in the effort to influence its outcome. Whatever new doctrines new administrations announce, this rarely is the last word. Reality will impose itself on ideological visions. Moreover, America is too lively, engaged and open a society to always and finally endorse the line of its government, and recent polls indicate that there are considerable reservations over its more ideological leanings. The future direction of America's approach to the world and to Europe is not cast in concrete by the decisions now taken by the Bush Administration, it remains to be formed, confirmed or changed through controversial discussion. The extraordinary, possibly unique feature of the American debate is that Americans don't mind others taking part in it. In Europe, national publics are still some distance away from accepting as legitimate and natural the participation of other EU citizens in their domestic discourse. Americans, to the advantage of their European allies, have no such problems at least as long as Europeans make clear that they are and want to remain allies.

Because of this, the alliance with America is no straight-jacket, because of this it has survived for so long. To leave it makes no sense for Europe, not yesterday, not today and not tomorrow. Even if in a distant future, when the Union may have developed the mentality, the mechanism and the means to become an effective international player and have acquired a much greater weight in the relationship it is still likely to share more interests than differences with the United States. After all, for neither Europe nor America is there another partner on the globe equally committed to the same values and political traditions. If the two work together there is a real chance for the establishment of an equitable international order. If they do not, they will both fail.

A Transatlantic “New Deal” by Laurent Cohen-Tanugi*

The Wall Street Journal

While the Iraqi crisis has brought transatlantic tensions and resulting differences within Europe to the forefront of public opinion awareness, those tensions and differences are not new, and methodologically it is preferable to discuss them without reference to the complex debate regarding what to do about Iraq.

According to a majority of French commentators, the distinction established by Donald Rumsfeld between the “old Europe” under Franco-German influence and the “new Europe” resulting from the forthcoming enlargement also separates a “good Europe”, resisting its American ally, from a “bad” and outdated Europe subservient to it. The call for Euro-American unity launched last January 30 has thus been perceived as a betrayal of the European ideal by a group of eight European heads of State and government labeled as “Bush's mercenaries” by a French daily.

Such intra-European manicheism, however, is just as objectionable as the arrow shot by the US Defense Secretary at the elusive Franco-German line. Of course, the go-it-alone of Spain, Italy, Portugal, Great Britain, Denmark, Poland, the

* Mr. Cohen-Tanugi is a partner at the international law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, and a political writer. He has just published “Les Sentinelles de la liberté, l'Europe et l'Amérique au seuil du XXIe siècle” (Editions Odile Jacob).

Czech Republic and Hungary was politically incorrect at a time when Europe was trying hard to articulate at least some form of common position on Iraq. But the fact is that the Iraqi affair has been and remains a matter for national diplomacy, and from that perspective the “coup” of January 30 was primarily a response of the greater Europe to the freshly re-energized Franco-German tandem.

The widespread condemnation of the Eight’s initiative by the French media is somewhat disturbing for several reasons. First, it shows a surprising intolerance to European diversity, which justifies the customary suspicions of the “small” and less small European States toward a Franco-German leadership, or even a broader club of the larger States. To reduce the heads of eight important nations from the South, North and East of Europe – including a historical figure such as Vaclav Havel – to the status of America’s puppets seems either disingenuous or disparaging.

As a substantive matter, the call for transatlantic solidarity remained carefully within the current United Nations framework. In this respect, France is undoubtedly closer to the position expressed by its eight European partners than to the pacifist line adopted by Gerhard Schröder’s Germany since last summer.

Finally and most importantly, the hostility generated by the Eight’s expression of Euro-American solidarity suggests that a politically correct Europe should differentiate itself systematically from the United States, any demonstration to the contrary being criticized as “anti-European”. This attitude, which is growing in certain continental European circles, is worrisome, not only in and of itself as a key driver of the Atlantic divide today, but also because it runs counter the well-understood interests of the Europeans and risks breaking Europe, old or new, apart.

Three important lessons can be drawn from the current European and transatlantic turmoil. First, a common European foreign policy is unlikely ever to prosper without a basic agreement among Europeans on the appropriate positioning of the EU vis-a-vis the United States, taking into account the various sensitivities on the subject. This means as a practical matter that Europe will not succeed in building itself in a “structural” opposition to America.

Second, anti-Americanism paradoxically restrains the maneuvering capacity of any such foreign policy, by forcing European governments to periodically reaffirm their solidarity with Washington in order to strike a balance. By contrast, a more genuinely and consistently sympathetic attitude toward our American allies would facilitate specific differences between the two sides of the Atlantic on a case-by-case basis.

Third, if it were to extend beyond Iraq, German pacifism and the gap it is creating between Berlin and Washington would significantly complicate not only the emergence of a European diplomacy, but also Franco-German politics and French diplomacy itself.

In order to avoid a further deterioration of both the European enterprise and its longstanding and valuable relationship with America, the time has come to leave behind the old Gaullist antagonism between the Atlantic Alliance and a “European Europe”, in favor of what one might call a new “Euro-Atlanticism”. By this I mean a fresh approach that would reconcile the project of creating an

independent European world power – with all the political and financial implications thereof – on the one hand, and the preservation of a close solidarity with the United States when it comes to essential common causes, principles and interests, on the other.

Despite the present tensions, the Americans are probably more open to supporting such a transatlantic “new deal” today than their European counterparts. Will Jacques Chirac’s France and Tony Blair’s England live up to the challenge of initiating and leading this cultural revolution?

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INTERNATIONAL Alors que les désaccords s'amoncellent entre Paris et Washington
Irak : pour une initiative franco-américaine

PAR DOUG BEREUTER ET PIERRE LELLOUCHE*
le Figaro [21 février 2003]

Trois mois après le vote à l'unanimité de la résolution 1441 par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, les démocraties occidentales se sont profondément divisées sur le dossier irakien, alors même qu'un accord de fond existe quant au danger représenté par Saddam Hussein pour la sécurité internationale.

Alors que nous partageons le même objectif qui figure expressément dans la résolution 1441 d'éliminer les stocks d'armes de destruction massive dont nous savons qu'ils sont en possession du régime irakien depuis 1998, un fossé n'a cessé de se creuser ces dernières semaines entre nous quant aux moyens à mettre en œuvre pour atteindre cet objectif.

Non sans raison, l'Administration américaine est convaincue que Saddam Hussein n'a cessé de tricher avec la communauté internationale ces douze dernières années, et redoute de voir le dictateur irakien remettre certaines de ses armes de destruction massive aux mains de groupes terroristes. L'Amérique est également convaincue qu'après avoir violé seize résolutions de l'ONU Saddam ne cherche qu'à gagner du temps, en attendant que les conditions climatiques du Moyen-Orient, dès le printemps prochain, rendent impossible toute opération militaire de grande ampleur. Pour les tenants de cette thèse, ajouter des inspections ou de nouveaux inspecteurs ne ferait que faciliter le jeu du dictateur irakien et accroître les divisions à l'intérieur du camp des démocraties, tant aux Nations unies que dans l'Union européenne et l'Alliance atlantique.

Non sans raison également, la France, de son côté, défend l'idée que, dans les conditions actuelles, une telle guerre serait lourde de dangers encore plus graves pour la stabilité à long terme de l'ordre international. En l'absence de preuves

incontestables de violations irakiennes, une invasion de l'Irak, pour reprendre une expression récente du président Chirac, ne pourrait que précipiter davantage de terrorisme islamiste et voir proliférer nombre de «petits Ben Laden». La thèse française est que la guerre ne devrait donc être considérée que comme l'ultime option.

Jusque-là, la combinaison de puissantes pressions militaires américaines et d'inspections renforcées par les Nations unies a toutes les chances d'atteindre l'objectif souhaité, tout en évitant de verser le sang – particulièrement celui d'une population innocente, elle-même victime de la cruauté de Saddam Hussein depuis plus de deux décennies.

Ce débat de fond est à la fois légitime et sérieux. Il mérite bien mieux que l'escalade de noms d'oiseau et parfois d'insultes, des «belettes» au déferlement d'antiaméricanisme, que nous avons vu fleurir dans la presse ces dernières semaines.

Nous regrettons cette escalade, à la fois stupide et auto-infligée. L'idée selon laquelle «un camp de la guerre» combattrait en notre sein «un camp de la paix» est une absurdité. Ce à quoi nous devons faire face est une situation internationale complexe et dangereuse, qui résulte de la montée du terrorisme et de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. Une telle situation ne peut être affrontée que collectivement, et par l'unité de nos démocraties. Elle ne peut l'être que dans un esprit de respect et de compréhension mutuels, et non en essayant de nous contraindre ou de nous isoler les uns les autres. Malheureusement, les dommages déjà infligés aux relations transatlantiques sont profonds et du temps sera nécessaire à la cicatrisation de ces blessures.

De ce point de vue, il est pour le moins regrettable que Saddam Hussein ait pu diviser les alliés transatlantiques davantage que l'Union soviétique n'était parvenue à le faire pendant les cinquante années de la guerre froide. De surcroît, la question irakienne a aussi profondément divisé les Nations unies, tout autant que l'Union européenne, là encore entraînant des conséquences potentiellement dommageables.

Les manifestations du week-end dernier à travers le monde ont révélé l'aversion profonde de nos démocraties à l'égard de la guerre. Nous aussi, nous désirons ardemment que le désarmement et le respect des résolutions de l'ONU résultent d'une adhésion voulue de l'Irak, qui nous éviterait tout recours à la force militaire. Cette guerre-là, dont personne ne veut, peut cependant s'avérer nécessaire pour éviter des pertes de vies humaines plus horribles encore à l'avenir. Une résolution pacifique de ce conflit est la solution que nous souhaitons tous.

Le temps est venu – nous en sommes convaincus – de la désescalade; d'atténuer les tensions entre nous et de mettre en place une action commune et efficace pour résoudre cette crise. A cet égard, nous nous réjouissons des signes positifs intervenus ces derniers jours, qu'il s'agisse de l'accord conclu à l'Otan dimanche soir sur la solidarité avec la Turquie, comme des discussions constructives qui se sont déroulées lors des rencontres parlementaires de l'Otan des 16 et 17 février dernier. Autant de signes auxquels s'ajoutent les conclusions équilibrées du sommet européen également tenu à Bruxelles lundi, qui montrent une attention nouvelle et bienvenue des alliés au respect et à l'écoute mutuels.

En laissant résolument de côté les polémiques stériles de ces dernières semaines, nous

sommes convaincus qu'il existe une issue à cette crise. Celle-ci se trouve en toutes lettres dans le rapport présenté au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies par M. Hans Blix, chef des inspecteurs de l'ONU. Qu'a dit Hans Blix à cette occasion? Que le désarmement irakien peut être accompli dans une période de temps relativement courte. Celui-ci ajoute: «Aujourd'hui, trois mois après l'adoption de la résolution 1441, le temps nécessaire au désarmement au travers des inspections peut encore être court si l'Unmovic et l'AIEA obtenaient une coopération immédiate, active et inconditionnelle» (de la part des Irakiens).

Nous appelons donc les chefs d'Etat de nos deux pays –le président George Bush et le président Jacques Chirac– en liaison avec les responsables de pays alliés et amis, à déclarer solennellement que Saddam Hussein a deux semaines pour se conformer à la résolution 1441 et donner aux inspecteurs une coopération immédiate, active et inconditionnelle.

Nous leur demandons de définir une liste de critères clairs, tels que le survol de l'Irak par des appareils de reconnaissance, et l'organisation d'entretiens hors du territoire irakien pour l'ensemble des scientifiques concernés par les programmes d'armes de destruction massive. Le respect de tels critères pourra être aisément vérifié par les inspecteurs. Nous saurions ainsi si Saddam Hussein est vraiment désireux de désarmer, ou s'il cherche à flouer une nouvelle fois la communauté internationale, en risquant une nouvelle guerre.

Si le régime irakien apportait sa coopération active, augmenter le nombre d'inspecteurs deviendrait inutile, car toutes les informations nécessaires seraient fournies volontairement. En revanche, si l'Irak devait continuer sa politique d'obstruction et de défi, un nombre illimité d'inspecteurs ne suffirait jamais à trouver les stocks cachés ou les installations mobiles de fabrication d'armes de destruction massive dispersés à travers son vaste territoire – cela vaut tout particulièrement pour les armes biologiques dévastatrices.

Ces deux semaines doivent être celles de la dernière chance offerte à Saddam Hussein. Si l'Irak acceptait de manifester une véritable volonté de coopération avec les inspecteurs de l'ONU, deux semaines suffiraient pour que les inspecteurs obtiennent toutes les informations dont ils ont besoin, qu'il s'agisse de la localisation des sites d'armes ou de missiles prohibés ou des preuves que ces matériels ont déjà été détruits par les Irakiens eux-mêmes. Rappelons que les inspections des Nations unies ont constaté leur existence en 1998, mais que, malgré moult dénégations, le régime irakien n'a jamais présenté les preuves de leur destruction.

En l'absence de telles preuves, la communauté internationale, y compris le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, devra en conclure que l'Irak viole de manière flagrante la résolution 1441, ce qui entraînerait comme chacun sait «des conséquences sérieuses» en cas de non-application. Dans ce cas, nos pays devront agir ensemble pour restaurer la crédibilité des Nations unies et de l'Alliance. Si nous ne parvenons pas à obtenir pacifiquement le désarmement irakien, nous devons retrouver notre solidarité dans une action militaire que nous ne souhaitons pas, mais que nous voulons commune.

* Doug Bereuter est membre de la Chambre des représentants des Etats-Unis, Président de la sous-commission aux affaires européennes de cette même Chambre,

président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'Otan. Pierre Lellouche est député (UMP) de Paris, membre de la commission des affaires étrangères de l'Assemblée nationale et vice-président de l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'Otan.

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Anti Americanism on the Rise – What Time Magazine and The Economist think

Time Magazine - 20th January 2003

Mad At America - Time Magazine

Europe has long had a love-hate relationship with the U.S. But as an unpopular war looms, anger and resentment are peaking. A calm look at a stormy — but resilient — alliance

BY J.F.O. MCALLISTER LONDON

"Anti-Americanism in Europe," says a senior U.S. diplomat, "is creeping apace." As the military buildup continues against Iraq — without any obvious casus belli found by the weapons inspectors — "people are getting especially twitchy," says a British official.

The shared horror after Sept. 11 that led Le Monde to declare "We are all Americans" has vanished. In its place: European scorn for an American military response to terrorism that hasn't done much to win hearts and minds in the Muslim world. A poll by the Pew Global Attitudes Project shows regard for the U.S. dropping in almost all European countries since 2000 — down 17 percentage points in Germany, eight in Britain, six in Italy.

American conservative intellectuals think the shift is already past the point of no return: they see a Europe devoted to lowest-common-denominator consensus, allergic to conflict, pathetically trying to restrain with vapid legalisms the only country with the strength and guts to do the dirty work of a Hobbesian world. In the cauldron of the White House, that viewpoint is boiled down to a brutal shorthand: "Eurowimp." And the bad feelings are mutual

As American and British forces deployed to the Middle East last week, European Union foreign-policy chief Javier Solana warned that "without proof" that Saddam harbors banned weapons, "it would be very difficult" for Europe to support the war. And Europe's three most powerful leaders are showing the strain of being pulled in opposite directions by powerful forces: their own antiwar publics, and the hyperpower in Washington preparing for regime change in Baghdad.

With opposition to an Iraq war consistently running between 70% and 80% in Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is sticking to the pledge that got him re-elected and made Bush despise him: to keep German forces out of it. But Berlin watchers consider it unthinkable that Germany, which wants a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, will cast a lonely vote against authorizing force if the weapons inspectors find a violation.

French President Jacques Chirac must straddle a similar razor. According to a poll

published in *Le Parisien* last week, only 15% of French voters support the use of their military against Iraq — even if the Security Council endorses war. So far Chirac's rhetoric has played to the majority, but that may not last. "He and those around him are convinced that if we want a role in the Middle East afterward, we have to be on board with the Americans," says Philippe Moreau Defarges, an analyst at the French Institute of International Relations. If Chirac does fall into line behind Bush for reasons of state, his constituency will feel betrayed — and blame the American "bully" as much as they blame their own leader.

Even Blair is taking so much heat in his own Labour Party for backing Bush on Iraq that last week he warned that U.N. inspectors should be given all the time they need to finish their job, and devoted big chunks of a major speech to the perils of anti-Americanism, calling it "a foolish indulgence." He even included some blunt advice for Washington. "People listen to the U.S. on issues and may well agree with them," he said. "But they want the U.S. to listen back."

Those with long memories might be tempted to say: Stop bellyaching, we've been here before. Europe and Washington have stared at each other in fury and incomprehension many times in the past, from the French-British- Israeli campaign to reclaim the Suez Canal that Dwight Eisenhower gutted in 1956 to the deployment of Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe under Ronald Reagan, who once prompted the same sort of "ignorant cowboy" epithets now heard about Bush. Each time commentators anguished about wounds that would never heal. They were wrong. (Reagan's reputation improved after the fall of the Berlin Wall. If Bush manages to win the war against terrorism, his will too.) In some ways, Europe and America are more alike than ever. The level of commercial interpenetration, the number of young people choosing to study and work across the Atlantic, and the spread of a common mass culture from Disney and *The Sopranos* to reality TV and Penélope Cruz (two European exports to the U.S.) has never been greater.

For Europeans, the relationship starts to break down when the U.S. goes into "You're either with us or against us" mode. Differences over Iraq have been bolted onto a bridge that has been creaking under many other strains since Bush came to power: U.S. failure to back the Kyoto accords on global warming, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Landmine Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the International Criminal Court; his decision to back steel tariffs and \$52 billion in farm subsidies despite preaching free trade (a charge of which the E.U. is equally guilty); and, above all, abandoning Bill Clinton's intense engagement in the Middle East peace process.

Blair has found Bush's apathy toward the Middle East so frustrating that he finally sought to convene an all-party conference of his own in London. ... Like other European leaders, Blair is passionately convinced that failure to tackle the Israeli-Palestinian dispute lends credence to the claim of fundamentalist Muslims that the war on terror and the war on Iraq are really a war against Islam. Bush's other major policy slip in European eyes was to forge Iran, Iraq and North Korea into an "axis of evil."

According to the Pew poll, 76% of Russians, 75% of French, 54% of Germans and 44% of British believe the desire to control Iraq's oil lies behind Bush's bellicosity —

another deep rift with the U.S., where only 22% hold this view. Americans, even those who oppose the war, are more likely to believe that Bush is trying to make the world a safer place.

Scratch a European complaint about the U.S. and it almost always reveals the person of George W. Bush — the "toxic Texan," as one American diplomat ruefully puts it. The President's domestic record embodies things many Europeans find strange, if not repellent, about the U.S.: pro-gun, pro-death penalty, pro-Christian, antiabortion, strongly patriotic. A worldwide survey by the University of Michigan confirms that Americans have basic values that are notably more traditional than Europeans, closer in this respect to those of Indians and Turks than to Germans or Swedes. Particularly offensive to Europeans are Bush's swagger, tough talk and invocations of God and right and wrong, part of his born-again tradition that is attuned to the U.S. mood after Sept. 11

"Europeans assume such language conceals power interests. We don't like to mix up power interests with good and evil." Karsten Voigt, coordinator of German-American relations at the Foreign Ministry, says simply: "Self-doubt is stronger here than in America."

So is a nagging sense of inadequacy compared to the American behemoth, with a defense budget that's bigger than the next 25 countries' combined — and the confidence to use it. In the two biggest recent challenges to European security, Bosnia and Kosovo, it still took American intervention (after many missteps) to finally put things right.

Despite resentment of the Bush Administration's bad-cop strut, it has achieved results: getting Russia to accept Bush's missile defenses and encouraging Vladimir Putin to cast his lot with the West, and squeezing the Security Council into its 15-0 vote on Iraq. Though Bush's decision to go through the U.N. had plenty to do with domestic public opinion — a survey by the German Marshall Fund and Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, on which he was briefed, showed that 65% of Americans wanted U.N. blessing for any war — the move nevertheless took considerable diplomatic skill and patience, reflected concern for other countries' opinions and confounds the easy European caricature of Bush. Besides the Iraq vote, Bush also assembled a big coalition for Afghanistan. The most deafening European complaint about Washington these days is insularity: that no one but Colin Powell picks up the phone and that Bush pays no mind to leading opinion beyond his own shores.

Despite the strains, there is a lot of resilience built into the Atlantic alliance. European regard for America may be declining, but it's still high: 61% approval in Germany, 63% in France, 70% in Italy, 75% in Britain, actually up 24 points in Russia to 61%.

Heavyweights on both sides of the Atlantic recognize the mounting dangers and are working hard to counter them. Michael Howard, the British Conservative Party's shadow Chancellor, has been expanding a group called Atlantic Partnership, which recruits senior figures in Europe and the U.S. "We want to create a climate of opinion where decision makers on both sides try to manage their differences in a way that minimizes the dangers to the relationship as a whole, which is of great importance, not just to Europe and America but the world," he says.

He must get through Iraq, a crucial test in European eyes of whether he intends to lead the international system or go around it. In the long run, further strains will be placed on the alliance as mass immigration to the U.S. from non-European countries and a shift of its economic center of gravity south and west dull the instinct to look toward Europe, just as Europe is shifting its own gaze eastward to accommodate new members. But alliances, like families, can be permitted a little squabbling as they grow. Sometimes family feuds can get nasty and downright weird; sometimes the old fights are more comfortable than recognizing how much you have in common. But as any therapist will tell you, the only way to keep a family together is to keep talking.

With reporting by William Boston and Charles P. Wallace/Berlin, Bruce Crumley, Nicholas Le Quesne and Grant Rosenberg/Paris, James Graff/Brussels and Jeff Israely/Rome

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**American values - Living with a superpower - Jan 2nd 2003
From The Economist print edition**

Some values are held in common by America and its allies. As three studies show, many others are not

"WE SHARE common values – the common values of freedom, human rights and democracy." Thus George Bush in the Czech Republic on November 21st; but it could have been him, his national security adviser or his secretary of state at almost any time.

Now consider this: "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world... Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus." Thus the Carnegie Endowment's Robert Kagan; but it could have been any number of transatlantic pessimists at any point in the past two years.

The question of "values" is one of the more contentious and frustrating parts of the foreign-policy debate. Obviously, values matter in themselves and in their influence on the conduct of a nation's affairs. Equally obviously, Europeans and Americans both share and dispute "basic" values. But a concept that can support flatly contradictory views of the world and transatlantic relations evidently stands in need of refinement.

Three new reports attempt to do that job. One cannot say they resolve the question of whether shared values are more important than contested ones. But at least they provide a way of thinking about and judging the so-called "values debate".

Last month, the Pew Research Centre published the broadest single opinion poll so far taken of national attitudes in 44 countries. In general, the findings bear out the president's view, rather than Mr Kagan's: more seems to unite America and its allies than divide them.

In 2002, 61% of Germans, 63% of the French and 75% of Britons said they had a favourable view of the United States. Majorities of the populations liked America in 35 of the 42 countries where this question was asked (it was banned in China).

It is true that America's image has slipped a bit. The pro-American share of the population has fallen since 2000 by between four and 17 points in every west European country bar one (France, where opinion was least favourable to begin with). All the same, the reservoir of goodwill remains fairly deep and reports of sharply rising anti-Americanism in Europe seem to be exaggerated.

This finding is at odds with the reams of editorialising about growing hostility between America and the rest of the world. But it is consistent with another recent survey by the German Marshall Fund and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (see chart 1). Asked to rate other countries on a scale of one to 100, the six European countries rated America at 64 (more than France), while Americans gave Europeans between 55 (for France) and 75 (for Britain). Feelings towards Israel diverge sharply: it is rated at only 38 in Europe, against 55 in America. But despite that divide, and whatever the elites may say, the ordinary folk on either side of the Atlantic continue to like one another.

The two sides also share a number of more specific similarities. The Pew study found that between two-thirds and three-quarters of Europeans support "the US-led war on terror". Between two-thirds and four-fifths called Iraq a serious threat. Everyone admires American science, technology and popular culture.

In both the Marshall Fund and Pew studies, there were surprisingly few significant differences in public attitudes towards the armed forces (around three-quarters think their role in their countries is positive), nor was there much difference in public readiness to use force abroad. The Marshall study found that support for multilateral institutions like the United Nations or NATO is every bit as strong in America as Europe. In the Pew study, majorities in nearly every country said the world would be less safe if there were a rival superpower (see table below). This was true even in Russia.

Strikingly, over 80% of Americans say they want strong international leadership from the European Union, while over 60% of Europeans say they want the same thing from America. And when asked whether differences between their countries and America were the result of conflicting values or conflicting policies, most respondents in west European, Latin American and Muslim countries chose policies.

Divisions of the ways

All this sounds like music to the ears of the Bush administration. It argues that the way to win hearts and minds is to emphasise universal values: explain your policies, of course, but stress that America strives for values which everyone shares. Unfortunately, there is also much in the Pew study which casts doubt on that idea.

For one thing, the reservoir of goodwill seems to run dry in the Muslim world. The Pew study found that large majorities in four of America's main Muslim allies – Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan and Turkey – dislike America. There are obviously

difficulties in measuring opinion in some of these places, but the results are still striking: in Egypt, 6% were favourable, 69% unfavourable; in Jordan, 25% and 75%.

Even where opinion overall is more flattering, as in Europe, there are signs of cultural clashes. If policies were the main problem, rather than values, you would expect people to have a higher opinion of Americans than of America. But the distinction is fading. West Europeans have a slightly more positive view of the people than the country, but they are exceptions: only 14 of 43 countries expressed more positive views about Americans than of America. And even though most Europeans say they like America, between half (in Britain) and three-quarters (in France) also say the spread of American ideas and customs is bad. As many Europeans say they dislike American ideas about democracy as like them. And this is from the part of the world that knows and claims to like America best.

In other words, people outside Muslim countries like America but not some of the most important things it stands for. What is one to make of that conflicting evidence? The short answer is that Europeans and Americans dispute some values and share others. But one can do better than that. Consider the third recent report, the world values survey run by the University of Michigan.

Unlike the other two polls, this survey goes back a long way. The university has been sending out hundreds of questions for the past 25 years (it now covers 78 countries with 85% of the world's population). Its distinctive feature is the way it organises the replies. It arranges them in two broad categories. The first it calls traditional values; the second, values of self-expression.

The survey defines "traditional values" as those of religion, family and country. Traditionalists say religion is important in their lives. They have a strong sense of national pride, think children should be taught to obey and that the first duty of a child is to make his or her parents proud. They say abortion, euthanasia, divorce and suicide are never justifiable. At the other end of this spectrum are "secular-rational" values: they emphasise the opposite qualities.

The other category looks at "quality of life" attributes. At one end of this spectrum are the values people hold when the struggle for survival is uppermost: they say that economic and physical security are more important than self-expression. People who cannot take food or safety for granted tend to dislike foreigners, homosexuals and people with AIDS. They are wary of any form of political activity, even signing a petition. And they think men make better political leaders than women. "Self-expression" values are the opposite.

Obviously, these ideas overlap. The difference between the two is actually rooted in an academic theory of development (not that it matters). The notion is that industrialisation turns traditional societies into secular-rational ones, while post-industrial development brings about a shift towards values of self-expression.

The usefulness of dividing the broad subject of "values" in this way can be seen by plotting countries on a chart whose axes are the two spectrums. The chart alongside (click to enlarge it) shows how the countries group: as you would expect, poor countries, with low self-expression and high levels of traditionalism, are at the bottom

left, richer Europeans to the top right.

But America's position is odd. On the quality-of-life axis, it is like Europe: a little more "self-expressive" than Catholic countries, such as France and Italy, a little less so than Protestant ones such as Holland or Sweden. This is more than a matter of individual preference. The "quality of life" axis is the one most closely associated with political and economic freedoms. So Mr Bush is right when he claims that Americans and European share common values of democracy and freedom and that these have broad implications because, at root, alliances are built on such common interests.

But now look at America's position on the traditional-secular axis. It is far more traditional than any west European country except Ireland. It is more traditional than any place at all in central or Eastern Europe. America is near the bottom-right corner of the chart, a strange mix of tradition and self-expression.

Americans are the most patriotic people in the survey: 72% say they are very proud of their country (and this bit of the poll was taken before September 2001). That puts America in the same category as India and Turkey. The survey reckons religious attitudes are the single most important component of traditionalism. On that score, Americans are closer to Nigerians and Turks than Germans or Swedes.

Of course, America is hardly monolithic. It is strikingly traditional on average. But, to generalise wildly, that average is made up of two Americas: one that is almost as secular as Europe (and tends to vote Democratic), and one that is more traditionalist than the average (and tends to vote Republican).

But even this makes America more distinctive. Partly because America is divided in this way, its domestic political debate revolves around values to a much greater extent than in Europe. Political affiliation there is based less on income than on church-going, attitudes to abortion and attitudes to race. In America, even technical matters become moral questions. It is almost impossible to have a debate about gun registration without it becoming an argument about the right to self-defence. In Europe, even moral questions are sometimes treated as technical ones, as happened with stem-cell research.

The difference between the two appears to be widening. Since the first world values survey in 1981, every western country has shifted markedly along the spectrum towards greater self-expression. America is no exception. But on the other spectrum America seems to have become more traditional, rather than less. The change is only a half-step. And Italy, Spain and France have taken the same half-step. But if you look at Europe as a whole, the small movement back towards old-fashioned virtues in big Catholic countries is far outweighed by the stride the other way in post-Protestant countries such as Germany and Sweden. On average, then, the values gap between America and European countries seems to be widening.

Where evil is real

What is the significance of this? If "quality-of-life" values have political implications, helping to underpin democracy, might traditional values help explain differing attitudes to, say, the projection of power?

In principle, two things suggest they might. Patriotism is one of the core traditional values and there is an obvious link between it, military might and popular willingness to sustain large defence budgets. There may also be a link between America's religiosity and its tendency to see foreign policy in moral terms. To Americans, evil exists and can be fought in their lives and in the world. Compared with Europe, this is a different world-view in both senses: different prevailing attitudes, different ways of looking at the world.

If you go back to the Pew and Marshall Fund studies, you can see hard evidence for this difference and it goes beyond immediate policy concerns. In the Pew study, three-quarters of west Europeans and an even higher share of east Europeans support the American-led war on terrorism but more than half in both places say America does not take other countries into account (whereas three-quarters of Americans think their government does).

In both studies, Americans and Europeans put the same issues at the top of their concerns religious and ethnic hatred, international terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons. In that respect, America and Europe have more in common with each other than with African, Asian and Latin American countries, for whom the spread of AIDS and the gap between rich and poor are at least as important.

But both studies show differences in the balance of European and American anxieties. In the Pew poll, 59% of Americans think the spread of nuclear weapons is the greatest danger to the world. Between 60% and 70% of Europeans put religious and ethnic hatred first. In the Marshall Fund study, around 90% of Americans say international terrorism and Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction are "critical". The comparable figures for Europe are around 60%. In short, even if Americans and Europeans see one another in similar terms, they see the world differently.

One might object that such values-based judgments are still not everything. The two sides of the Atlantic have long lived with a related problem: the cultural split between "vigorous, naive" America and "refined, unprincipled" Europe. They have successfully managed that, just as they have coped with the political awkwardness that America's centre of gravity is further to the right than Europe's.

What is different now? Two things. The first is that the values gap may be widening a little, and starting to affect perceptions of foreign-policy interest on which the transatlantic alliance is based. The second is that, in the past, cultural differences have been suppressed by the shared values of American and European elites and elite opinion is now even more sharply divided than popular opinion. It is the combination of factors that makes the current transatlantic divisions disturbing. And it is little consolation that, in the face of some mutual hostility, the Bush administration is insisting it is all just a matter of politics, and not of something deeper.

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Senator, Democrat

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The Rt Hon Lord Gilbert – United Kingdom

Former Defence Minister under the present Labour government

Karsten Voigt – Germany

US German Coordinator in the present German Government

Friedrich Merz – Germany

Head of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag

Senator Antonio Martino – Italy

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Catherine Fall - Director worldwide

Douglas Seay - Director USA

Owen Pengelly – Associate Director USA

How to make contact with Atlantic Partnership

Catherine Fall in London

Telephone: 020 7738 1423

cfall@workcambridge.fsnet.co.uk

Owen Pengelly in the USA

Telephone: 301 907 6826

owenpengelly@mac.com

You can visit our website at:

www.atlanticpartnership.com